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STATE OF IDAHO, 
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vs 
LAWRENCE R LUTTON, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Boise County 
Honorable Patrick H Owen, District Judge 
LA WREN CE G WASDEN, 
Attorney for Respondent 
MICHAEL BARTLETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
Filed this ,Z.{)"'J,,y of .-f 
Mary Prisco, Clerk 
By Kelly White, Deputy 
. 20/; FILED· COPY 
SEP 1 8 2015 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST ATE OF IDAHO 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
vs. 











SUPREME COURT NO. 43257 
r'iAC'ID1'TAr'1TI r"\f\1A 11,.,1 
vfi0D l'IV.\...,1'.- L.Vl't-11.)1 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
for the County of Boise. 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL J9i: ---==-
DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BOISE com;ry 
Supreme Court No. 4 :s}S 





LAWRENCE R LUTTON_ ) _ 
Defendant/Appe!lanl ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CASE NO. CR-2014-0001131 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEAL 
Appeal from: Fourth Judicial District, Boise County, Honorable Patrick H. Owen , Presiding. 
Case number from court: CR-2014-000113 l 
Order or Judgement appealed from: Order Withholding Judgement and Order of Unsupervised 
Probation 
Attorney for AppelJant: Michael Bartlett 
Attorney for Respondent: Lawrence G. Wasden 
Appealed by: Lawrence R. Lutton 
Appealed against: State ofidaho 
Notice of Appeal filed: May 22, 2015 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed: 
Appellate fee paid: No 
Respondent or. Cross-Respondent's request for additional record filed: 
Respondent 01· Cross-Respondent's request for additional Reporter's Transcript filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
If so Name of Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Mary Prisco 
C k of the District Court 
IANW.GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
Tel: (208) 392-4485 
Fax: (208) 392-3760 
MAGISTRATE'S DiViSiON 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY. IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 





LAWRENCE R LUTTON, ) 
DOB: ) 




Defendant . ) 
Case No. CR 2014-0 / f 3 { 
COMPLAINT 
PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this _il_ day of £_~ 
2014, IAN W. GEE/ JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, complains 
and says that the Defendant, LA WREN CE R LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did then and there commit the crime against 
the people of the State of Idaho, to-wit: 






Idaho Code §18-4006(3)(b), Felony 
That the Defendant, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did wilfully, unlawfully but without malice kill 
R.L., a human being, by operating a motor vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 2000 Toyota Corolla 
bearing Idaho License plate number E 121969 on or at North Arrowork Road, milepost 8.5 
in the c01mnission of a violation of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, by driving his motor 
vehicle while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs with a blood alcohol concentration of .092, 
causing an accident in which the vehicle left the roadway and drove itlto the water which 
caused his death. t1 
COUNT II 
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
Idaho Code §18-8004, Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, LAWRENCE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 200 Toyota Corolla, bearing Idaho license plate number E 
121969, on or at North Arrowrock Road, milepost 8.5 while impaired by alcohol and/or 
drugs, and/or while driving under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration 
of .08 or more, to-wit: .092, as shown by an analysis of his blood. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute(s) in such case, 
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Said Complainant therefore prays that a Summons be issued for the Defendant, 
LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, and that he may be dealt with according to 111-"1-,,...--~ 
Boi nty Prosecuting Attorney/ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / t day of~' 2014. 




COMPLAINT (LA WREN CE R. LUTTON), Page 3 
• I 
Jul' 25 2014 11:54AM Nevin Benjamin,M Bart 208 345 827 4 
Michael Bartlett 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 {f) 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
page ,~ 
••,.~lt,TnATC:IQ l""\_I\HOlr"\!i\l 
MMl.:m;, I nMI J;;; 0 .... , V IOIVI~ 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY. IDAHO 
JUL 2 5 2014 
Filed . 3: I:;) No. / 
~. RY~. PRISCO, CLERK 
By,,~~ .. ,Oepuly 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, WAND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff, . 
vs. 












CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
INVOCATION OF RIGHTS 
The Defendant hereby invokes his rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney 
\vith respectto any and all questioning, interviews, or interrogation. regardless of the subject 
matter, including, but not limited to: matters that may bear on or relate to guilt or innocence, 
arrest, searches and seizures, bail, pretrial release or detention, evidence at trial, forfeitures~ 
sentencing, immigration status or consequences, appeals, or other post-conviction proceedings. 
The Defendant respectfully requests that the prosecuting attorney insure that this 
-invocation of rights is honored, by forwarding a copy ofit as is necessary to all law enforcement 
agents, agencies, government or state officials, or employees associated with the investigation of 
any matters relating to the Defendant. 
1 • INVOCATION OF RIGHTS 
ORIGINAL 
Jul 25 2014 11:54AM Nevin art 208 345 827 4 page )3 
f 
Any contact with the Defendant mtist be made through the Defendant's lawyer, 
undersigned counsel. 
DATED this ~y of July, 2014. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~IL~ MiaelBartiett · 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thls 2$ fay of July, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy 




to: Boise County Prosecutor, P.O. Box 186, Idaho City, ID 83631 
2 • INVOCATION OF RIGHTS 
I 
Jul 28 2014 3:18PM Nevin Benjamin,McK. art 208 345 8274 
ju i. 28. 2014 1: nPM 
Michael Ba11lett ISB#5496 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P,O, Bqx:2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343· 1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
h•.:n-t1.-.tt/,;'\nk."'1a.,i:r f'-f\,W'I 
V'-"lt. '"'"'"''4~,,u., •• ,u ........ ""V,lA,C. 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
page 2 
" •• MAGOl~IBR~I~'§!)_l~§ION 
No j 1 IHJ hil II.ii l.iUUH I 
' FOURTii'JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY IDAHO 
JUL 2 8 20t4· 
·3·-
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT FOR THE FOURTH 1UD1CIALDIST1UCT OF· 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOf SE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) ____________ ) 
CASE NO. CR,-2014-1131 
STIPULATION TO RES:ET 
TIME FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
The State, through its attorney Jay Rosenthal, and the Defendant, through his attorney 
Michael Baitlett, stipulate that the an-aignment presently set for Monday, August 11, 2014, at 
9:30 a.m., be reset to 11 :00 a.m. that same day. Good cause exists to grant this Stipulation 
because counsel fer the Defendant has a court conflict that canno1 be reset in Ada County the 
morning of August 11. 2014, at 8:30 a.m. Defense counsel wishes to be present with Defendant 
at the arraignment and believes that a re.set of the time to 11 :00 a.m. on August 11, 2014 will 
give him enough time to attend his Ada County hearing and travel to Boise County for this case. 
On 1nn:>1 fY' c-hnn onJ b.e. l~~ , -th.tM... Ot't. /\o pttl,l'fh/\OJJ h..t.o..r U)\>5 
Sc.,k.o)u \, C ~ r At..<jv$.f.. l lJ-l I ic> ic..t. A.\- n·. I'.) o a •l\- I• --~ 
1 • STlPULA TfON TO RESET TIME FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
Jul is 2014 3:18PM Nevin Benjamin,Mc, art 208 345 8274 
Jul.28.2014 1:32PM 
At 
DATED this & day of July, 2014. 
page 3 
/ 
I. No. 3146 P. 2 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT 
2 • STIPULATION TO RESET TJME FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
Aug 28 2014 10:27AM Nevin Benjamin, __ 
( 
I 
Bart 208 345 827 4 
Aug. 28. 2Dl4 8: 18AM 
Michael Bartlett 1SB#S496 . 
. NEVIN,BENJAMIN>McKAY &BARTLETTLLP 
303_ West BannocK 
P.O.Box2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345~8274 
bartiett(@,pbmiaw.com 
Attorneys for the Defendent 
., .. )l...1~Gf~Tf1AI!:'S DIVISION 
NO, J4'.)U DIS'r.RHHCOUAT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUMTY, IDAHO 
AUG 2 8 2014 
Filed / d: I Q. , No. 1./ 
B ~~RI< . 
Y . ~ ., Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND :FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff; 
'VS. 










) ___________ ) 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
STIPULATION TO VACATE 
AND RESET PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 
The State, thrQugh its atton1ey Jay Rosenthal, and the Defendant, through his attorney 
Michael Bartlett, stipulate that the preliminary hearing presently set for Tuesdayj September 2, 
:2014~ at 11:00 a.m., be reset to a date after October 7, 2014. Good ca'llse exists to grant this 
Stipulation as the additional time will be used for scientific testing and negotiations which m~y 
l'esult in the l'esofotion of the case. The Defendant is aware of his right to have a preliminary 
hearing within 21 days of his initial appeaf3nce and hereby waives that right. 
1 • STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET I>ltELJMINARY HEARING 
Aug 28 2014 10:27AM Nevin Benjamin,, &Bart 208 345 8274 
A,,., 'lA ·.·1n1,1 A·. 1,Q,,A.,M., ( 
fl W' E,• 11,\h L\I I "I ., 
page. 
( 
No. 3450 P. 3 
. . ·. Jt; 
DATED this 2B day of Augus~ 2014 . 
. NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT 
~dtl.Jlb•= MiclaelBnrtlett · ·. · · 
. . 
OATEO this 26:ttlay of August; 2014. 
2 • STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET PRELTh1INARY HEARING 
Jul 28 2014 3:18PM Nevin Benjamin,McK art 208 345 8274 page 4 
MAGISTRATE'S 01V1Si0N 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY. IDAHO 
( 
JUL 3 0 Wi4 
Filed,._ l/: I:> No. / 
:?'*'FW RR~O, CLERK By.~0~f<' , Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
ORDER RESETTING TIME 
FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
--------------) 
Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the arraignment presently set for August 11, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. is 
o orable Roger Coe erille 
Magistrate Judge 
1 • ORDER RESETTING TIME FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
. , 
Time Speaker Note 
11 :12:14 AM !Arraignment CR- /call of case -Def pres w/DA 
12014-1 131 State 1 
!of Idaho v ! 
!Lawrence R l 
:Lutton - Judge 1 
!Roger E ; 
!Cockerille - Chf 
:Dpty Prosecutor 
!Jay Rosenthal -
!Def Atty Michael 
i Bartlett - Clerk 
18renda Hendryx 
11 : 12:27 AM iJ iadvise charges, rights, Understands rights , 
11 :15:08 AM iDa iwaive read ing of complaint 
11 : 15:18 AM jJ jprelim 9-2-14 11 :00, no bond 
11:16:26 AM iPA inc bail necessary 
11 : 16:36 AM jJ ianything else? no, no 
68-COURTROOM 
·1·{1·6:56 .. AM /End ................................... .. : ... . . . . . ... . .... ............................ ···························································································· 
8/11/2014 1 of 1 
I ;'"} 
Aug 28 2014 10:27AM Nevin Benjami/' _ Bart 208 345 827 4 
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAi. DISTRICT 
BO!SE COUNTY. IDAHO 
A~G 2 8 2014 / 
Filed 3 1 Id No. :;:;M~'fri~ISCO, C-LE_R_K __ 
By ~-46:t{< , Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) _____________ ) 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
ORDER RESETTING 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the preliminary hearing presently set for September 2, 2014, at 
+ 1 ,-\-\,..... / 
11 :00 a.m. is hereby reset to 06s:?~ ;;)D @ J;w A\\1,., 




Honorable Roger Cockerille 
Magistrate Judge 
1 • ORDER RESETTING PRELIMINARY HEARJNG 
( 
( 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of August, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Resetting Preliminary Hearing in the above referenced matter by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael J Bartlett 
303 West Bannock 
PO Box 2772 
Boise ID 83701 
y,J5-~'J7'7 
Boise County Prosecutor 
H:\Desktop\Certificate of Service.doc 
Mailed __ Hand Delivered _i_Faxed __ Emailed 
Mailed X Hand Delivered __ Faxed __ Emailed 
Mary Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
Deputy Clerk · 
08/28/14 
IANW.GEE 
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery Street 
P.O. Box 186 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
Tel: (208) 392-4485 





FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
OCT 2 0 2014 
l.:L'S(o No. 
~~Pf~CO, C-LE-RK--
By,_ ~~ , Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 








Case No. CR-2014-01131 
INFORMATION 
_D_e_fe_n_da_n_t __________ ) 
IAN W. GEE / JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, in and for the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the 
authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into District Court of the County 
of Boise, and states that LAWRENCE R. LUTTON is accused by this Infonnation of the 
crime(s) of: COUNT I, VEHICLE MANSLAUGHTER, Idaho Code §18-4006(3)(b), 
Felony, COUNT II, OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, Idaho Code §18-8004, 
Misdemeanor, which crime was committed as follows: 
COUNTI 
VEIDCULAR MANSLAUGHTER 
Idaho Code §18-4006(3)(b), Felony 
That the Defendant, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State ofldaho, did wilfully, unlawfully but without malice kill 
R.L., a human being, by operating a motor vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 2000 Toyota Corolla 
bearing Idaho License plate number E 121969 on or at North Arrowork Road, milepost 8.5 




in the commission of a violation of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, by driving his motor 
vehicle while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs with a blood alcohol concentration of .092, 
causing an accident in which the vehicle left the roadway and drove into the water which 
caused his death. 
COUNT II 
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
Idaho Code §18-8004, Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 200 Toyota Corolla, bearing Idaho license plate number E 
121969, on or at North Arrowrock Road, milepost 8.5 while impaired by alcohol and/or 
drugs, and/or while driving under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration 
of .08 or more, to-wit: .092, as shown by an analysis of his blood. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statutes in such case 
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(b ), Idaho Criminal Rules, the following is a list of all witnesses insofar 
as they are known to the State at this time, who are or may be witnesses in this action: 
Witness: Address: 
OLIVER CHASE IDAHO STATE POLICE 
JONATHAN VANCE IDAHO STATE POLICE 
BRANDON BAKE IDAHO STATE POLICE 
FRED RICE IDAHO STATE POLICE 
GEORGE SZELES IDAHO STATE POLICE 
RACHEL CUTLER ISP FORENSIC SCIENTIST 
BEN ROEBER BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
TERENCE ACKER BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
ROBERT TATILIAN BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
JOSH MCINTOSH BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
JOSH LEBOW BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
CRIS ANJELKOVICH BOISE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
CHRISTOPHER ZIMMER BOISE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
TRAVIS BOOK UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 
DEAN HICKMAN UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 

















BRAD FLEENOR UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 
JOSEPH PURCELL ADA COUNTY CORONER'S OFFICE 
GLEN R. GROBEN ADA COUNTY CORONER'S OFFICE 
DEBRA CHAPMAN RN AT ST. LUKES 
JAKE HECKATHORN WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
WILL RIGGS WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
JIM BRYANT WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
IVIELISSA POTTS WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
DAN HERRITY WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
TOM HORNER WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
JOY TAIT WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
BOB TAIT WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
HARRY BLODGETT WILDERNESS RANCH QRU 
ROB TALBURT MORES CREEK AMBULANCE 
DEBBIE TALBURT MORES CREEK AMBULANCE 
CHRIS BROOKMAN MORES CREEK AMBULANCE 
BARBARA SIDES MORES CREEK AMBULANCE 
QUINN JOHNSON EAST BOISE AMBULANCE 
KHRISTA HOLMAN 10045 LAKE SHORE DR. NAMPA, ID 83686 
JOSH HOLMAN 10045 LAKE SHORE DR.NAMPA, ID 83686 
BRIANNA BRECKS 873 DAWN DR. BOISE, ID 83713 
CHARLES CA VIN 4107 W. ALBIEN ST. BOISE, ID 83705 
JOSEPH MIKITISH 1019 ARROWHEAD ST. NAMPA, ID 83686 
NICOLE LEBOW UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME 
DERRICK EDAL UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME 



























NATALIE LUTTON 10353 W. DESERT DUCK AVE. MTN HOME, ID 83647 UNKNOWN 
CHRISTOPHER GAMBLE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME UNKNOWN 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
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vs. 








Case No. CR-2014-01131 
COMMITMENT 
____ D=efi=e=n=da=n=t. ______ _,) 
----...THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, having 
een brought) before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the ZO day of 
~---...,__.......,=--' 2014, on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did commit the crimes of COUNT I, 
VEHICLE MANSLAUGHTER, Idaho Code §18-4006(3)(b), Felony, COUNT II, 
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, Idaho Code §18-8004, Misdemeanor as follows: 
COUNTI 
VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER 
Idaho Code §18-4006(3)(b), Felony 
That the Defendant, LAWRENCE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did wilfully, unlawfully but without malice kill 
R.L., a human being, by operating a motor vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 2000 Toyota Corolla 
bearing Idaho License plate number E 121969 on or at North Arrowork Road, milepost 8.5 
in the commission of a violation of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, by driving his motor 
COMMITMENT (LA WREN CE R. LUTTON), Page 1 
/q 
( 
vehicle while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs with a blood alcohol concentration of .092, 
causing an accident in which the vehicle left the roadway and drove into the water which 
caused his death. 
COUNT II 
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
Idaho Code §18-8004, Misdemeanor 
That the Defendant, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, on or about the 23rd day of May, 
2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, to-wit: a maroon 200 Toyota Corolla, bearing Idaho license plate number E 
121969, on or at North Arrowrock Road, milepost 8.5 while impaired by alcohol and/or 
drugs, and/or while driving under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration 
of .08 or more, to-wit: .092, as shown by an analysis of his blood. 
The Defendant having so appeared and having had his preliminary examination, the 
Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as set forth has been 
committed in Boise County, Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to believe that the 
Defendant is guilty of committing the offenses as charged. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant, LA WREN CE R. 
LUTTON, be held to answer to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County f Boise, to the charge herein set forth. Bail is set in the 
sum of$ ______ --="I---------------------
DATED this'/)) day of O&ro!ML:-, 201 
MAGISTRATE 
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded in Book. o - -- - -- ---· ags, __ 
Filed DEC 1 6 2014 _ 
By ~~rk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR 2014-1131 
V. 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
LAWRENCE R. LUTTON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the court on December 11, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. 
for an arraignment of the above named Defendant. The attorneys present were: 
For the State: Jay Rosenthal 
For the Defendant: Michael Bartlett 
The Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial. The 
court instructed the clerk to enter the plea of not guilty into the court minutes. 
Pursuant to ICR 12 and ICR 18 the court hereby orders that the attorneys 
and Defendant shall comply with the following scheduling order: 
1) JURY TRIAL DATE: The two (2) day jury trial of this action shall commence 
before this court on April 2, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel and the defendant 
shall be present at 8:30 a.m. on the first day of trial. 
2) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE: Counsel for the parties and the Defendant shall 
appear b~fore this court on March 12, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. for the pre-trial 
conference. Counsel shall be prepared to discuss settlement possibilities 
pursuant to ICR 18. Failure of the Defendant to appear at this pre-trial 
conference will result in a forfeiture of bail and a bench warrant shall be 
issued by the court. 
All motions pursuant to ICR 12 and any other motions including Motions in 
Limine and Motions to Dismiss must be argued on or before February 12, 
2015 at 10:00 a.m. 
Each party shall be required to serve on all other parties and file with the 
Court a complete list of exhibits and witnesses in accordance with I.R.C.P. 
16(h). 
SCHEDULING ORDER-page I of2 
No. 
DEPUTY 
3) JURY INSTRUCTIONS: The parties shall submit all proposed jury 
instructions to the court on or before the pre-trial conference. It is sufficient for 
the parties to identify unmodified pattern instructions by number. 
4) SANCTIONS: Failure to comply with this order will subject a party or its 
attorney to appropriate sanctions, including but not limited to, costs, and 
reasonable attorney fees and jury costs. A party may be excused from strict 
compliance with any provisions of this Order only upon showing good cause. 
5) CONTINUANCES: The court will not grant continuances unless good cause 
exists and all the parties waive their right to speedy trial. 
DATED this i.h__ day of December, 2014. 
TRICKH. OWE 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this J 0 day of December, 2014, I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Jay Rosenthal 
Boise County Prosecutor's Office 
PO Box 186 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
SCHEDULING ORDER - page 2 of 2 
Michael Bartlett 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP 
PO Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
MARY PRISCO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By3_-tZ;:?z~ ~ , 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Recorded in Book Page __ 
Michael Bartlett 
Christopher Sherman 
Filed JAN 3 O 2015 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By.~ 
. P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 · 
(208) 343.1000 .. 
(208) 345·8274 (f). 
. . . .. . . 
· Attorneys for the Defendant . 
~ ... ·. 
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 















CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
I. RELEVANT FACTS1 
On May 23, 2014 at approximately 11 :09 p.m., Joe Mikitish was driving his Subaru 
northbound on Parkcenter Boulevard toward St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. In his 
backseat, Mr. Mikitish had two passengers, LaMence Lutton and Mr. Lutton's four-year-old son 
Earlier that evening, Mr. Lutton and rus two son nd two-year-ol ad 
been in an automobile accident when Mr. Lutton's au1omobile skidded off Arrowrock Dam Road 
1 The facts as stated in this memorandum are from the discovery and are the anticipated 
testimony at an evidentiary hearing. 
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landing upside down in the reservoir. 
Mr. Lutton's vehicle was quickly submerging, but Mr. Lutton was able to free himself 
and began diving into the passenger compartment of his car in an attempt to locate his two sons . 
. . .. _ Mr. Mikitish and an onlooker also jwnped in the water and joined in the search. After 
i /t,Jo~a~l}~o ~inutes, Mr. Lutton was able to free his son  from the car . . : .. - ... ·.· . ,. . . . 
. . . . 
Mr. Mildtish and Mr. Lutton subsequently took turns diving into the car. However, Mr ... 
•. •• Mikitish s,oo~.noted that Mr. Lutton, exhausted from numerous dives, appeared to be suffering 
.· . . . . 
· from exhaustion or hypothermia as he was "facing down in the water with his eyes closed and · 
was breathing slow shallow breaths." Mr. Mikitish then guided Mr. Lutton to shore and an 
onlooker took Mr. Lutton to Mr. Mikitish' s automobile. After a few more dives, Mr. Mikitish 
realized that he too was suffering from severe exhaustion and determined that he was at a severe 
risk of drowning and needed to return to shore. 
Returning to shore, Mr. Mikitish discovered that "  was awake butwas having a 
hard time staying awake and that Lawrence was shivering uncontrollably and his eyes were not 
able to track my finger." Mr. Mikitish also "could not determine if anyone had left or if help was 
on the way." Consequently, Mr. Mikitish announced to onlookers that he would transport 
 and Mr. Lutton to St. Luke's in Boise-and asked the onlookers to continue searching for 
 
Mr. Mikitish then began driving his two passengers to Boise. Approximately three blocks 
from St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Mr. Mikitish was stopped by Boise Police Officers 
Cris Anjelkovich and Chris Zimmer for speeding. Once he pulled over, Mr. Mikitish began 
2 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
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waving bis anns out the window and asking for help from the officers. He explained there had 
been an automobile accident and requested an escort to the hospital. Mikitish explained that 
Lutton's car had gone into the reservoir and that his passengers were bothhypothermic. The 
officers refused the escort, choosing instead to call paramedics to th_e ~ce~e .... 
· · While waii:L"1.g for their arrival, the officers interrogated 1\1r: :r-v1ikitisli and fvk L~tton 
about the accident. Officer Anjelkovich noted "a slight odor of an intoxicating beverage coming 
. . . . .. , .. \ . . . , . . . . 
from the vehicle" during the encounter and consequently requested Mr°: Mikitish to submit to 
standard field sobriety tests as well as a breath test. Mr. Mikitish blew 0.00. When Officer 
Zimmer questioned Mr. Lutton at the stop, he admitted to drinking three beers approximately 
nine hours earlier. Officer Zimmer noted that he detected no alcohol on Mr. Lutton's breath or 
person. 
After the paramedics arrived, Mr. Lutton and his son  were transported to St 
Luke's for emergency care. Officers Zimmer and Anjelkovich followed and stationed 
themselves with Mr. Lutton. Officer Anjelkovich re-interrogated Mr. Lutton in his hospital 
room. Mr. Lutton said he had three beers that day by 3 :00 p.m. While speaking to Mr. Lutton 
inside the hospital room, Officer Anjelkovich "did not smell anything." Nonetheless, Officer 
Anjelkovich informed Lawrence that "anytime we have a significant accident" and "since you've 
been drinking and we have an accident where we have injuries, we're going to read you an Idaho 
state fonn to take your b1ood." 
When Idaho State Police Officer Vance arrived, he continued the interrogation of Mr. 
Lutton. During the interrogation, Mr. Lutton's second child,  arrived at St. Luke's via Life 
3 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
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Flight. Believing that his son might die, Mr. Lutton asked for permission to see  Officer 
Vance refused and continued the interrogation. 
Mr. Lutton begged Officer Vance to allow him to see his son. Officer Vance then 
instructed Mr. Lutton that he could see his son only after submitting to a blood draw;· Desperate 
;:.,·.-
to see his son, Mr. Lutton agreed that Officer Vance could withdraw his blood in exchari.ge fo~ '. .. 
. . . . . . . ' . 
allowing him to visit  Officer Vance suqsequeiltly called in Registered Nurse Debra . ~ .. . . . ". 
Chapman, a St. Luke's employee, who carried e>ut abl~od draw in accordance with Officer 
Vance's direction. After the blood draw was completed; Officer vahce r~leased Mr. Lutton and 
. allowed him to see his son  Officer Van~e also noted that no odor of an alcoholic beverage 
was emanating from Mr. Lutton. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. The Search of Mr. Lutton was Unreasonable and Thus Unlawful 
1. A Warrantless Blood Draw is Presumptively Umeasonable 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches. A warrant1ess search is presumptively 
unreasonable. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 
288,290,900 P.2d 196,198 (1995). In order to prove that a warrantless search is not 
unreasonable, "[t]he burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell 
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under 
the circumstances." Weaver at 290, 198, citing State 11. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 
1210, 1212 (l989). A blood draw is a search protected by this prohibition against unreasonable 
4 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
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searches since "[ s ]uch an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual' S· 'most personal 
and deep-rooted expectations of privacy."' Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013), 
citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,763 (1985). 
In this matter, Officer Anj elkovich informed Mr. Lutto11 that,: for po,licy reasons, he would 
be requiredto submit t~ a ~f9od 4raw)n this case. Additicirially, ISP.Offi~er Vance informed Mr. 
. . . . . . . . ' . . . 
Lutton that he would-be required to undergo a blood draw before he was allo;ed to see his 
. . . ·. . \.. :- . . . : . /: .. · .,-.. '-.:. :.. -~ ~- . 
injured child. At the requ~st.:oflaw enforcement, St. Luke's personnel th~riperformed a blood 
draw upon Mr; Lutton for ihJ~stigatory purposes. 
This blood draw was a search subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution. The· state 
did not obtain a warrant at any time prior to this search of Mr. Lutton; thus, the search of Mr. 
Lutton was presumptively unreasonable. 
2. The Warrantless Search of Mr. Lutton was Unreasonable and Unlawful Because 
There is no Well-Established Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
fu order to overcome the presumption that a warrantless search was unreasonable and 
thus unlawfil4 the State must demonstrate that a "warrantless search fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement." State v. LaMay, MO Idaho 835, 837-38, 103 P.3d 448, 
450-51 (2004). In this matter, the State cannot demonstrate that the warrantless search was 
carried out pursuant to any well-recognized exception the warrant requirement. 
B. The Search was not Reasonable in Light of the Circumstances 
A search carried out pmsuant to a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
"must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances." Halen v. State, 
5 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
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136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d257, 261 (2002). citing Schmberber v. California, 384U.S. 757, 767 
(1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). Even if the search 
had been carried out pursuant to a well-recognized exception to the warrant requii'ement, the 
State cannot prove that the search was reasonable in light of the circumstances. ·. 
• • • • • • • • • :, ~~ • • ·-~ • • • • < • 
Frrst, the search was unreasonable becau~ it caused Mr.:Luiton grievous and unneeded 
· · suffering. On .the night in question, Mr. Lutton was in an extremely vulnerable state. Mr. Lutton 
.;,_ ' . : . . . . . -·.. .. . .. ··,· ... ·, · .. ·. : .. : ..... :··:· ... ·.-. ·. . 
··had spent ne~ly twenty minutes in Arrowrock Reservoir desperat~ly .attempting to rescue his two 
. . . .• . . . . 
so~s. · Since departing Arrowrock Reservoir for Boise, Mr; Lutton had received'no official 
· information regarding the status of his so While in his hospital room being interrogated 
by police; Mr. Lutton learned that Riley had been removed from the submerged car and that he 
had been transported to St. Luke's Regional Medical Center via air ambulance. 
Mr. Lutton pleaded to be allowed to see  But with law enforcement officers 
platooned inside and outside of his hospital room, Officer Vance demanded that Mr. Lutton 
submit to a blood draw before he would allow Mr. Lutton to tend to his grievously injured son. 
While hospital personnel attended to  and attempted to provide life-saving procedures, Mr. 
Lutton was forced to sit in a hospital room and endure an interrogation and search conducted by 
Officer Vance. 
Second, the search was unreasonable because Officer Vance conducted this search and 
investigation of Mr. Lutton even though he had no reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lutton had 
committed ay crime. Under Idaho law, an officer must have reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that a driver was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of before 
6 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
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subjecting an individual to field sobriety tests. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,480,988, P.2d 
700, 707 (Ct. App. 1999). An officer may then utilize the results of a field sobriety test to 
confirm or dispel an officer's reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the influence-and thus 
the.administration of field sobriety tests may allow an officer's reasonable suspicion to rise to 
. . . ,,, .. · 
probabie catcie.: State V. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,780,275 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Probable cause for an arrest and c~ernical testmg in the context of driving under the influence 
exists "where the facts and circutl).Stances within the officer's knowledge and of which he has 
reasonably trustworthy infonnatidn, are sufficientto warrant a prudent person in believing that 
the·suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 
65 P .3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding probable cause where defendant had sped, officers 
noted strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant, officers had noted bloodshot eyes and 
dilated pupils, and defendant had refused to perform field sobriety tests when requested), citing 
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,228 (1991). 
In this instance, Officer Vance had smelled no alcohol in speaking with Mr. Lutton. 
Similarly, Boise Police Officers Zimmer and Anjelkovich had smelled no alcohol in speaking 
with Mr. Lutto1L Officer Vance recognized no potential indications of intoxication. Mr. 
Lutton' s own admissions-that he had consumed three beers approximately nine hours 
earlier-corroborated Officer Vance's observations that Mr. Lutton was not intoxicated. Because 
Officer Vance had observed nothing that would give him reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lutton 
was intoxicated, Officer Vance also did not ask Mr. Lutton to perform standarctized field sobriety 
tests. 
7 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
~an 30 ·2015 4:18PM Nevin Benjarnin,McKa_ 208 345 8274 page 11 
( 
Instead, Officer Vance conducted the blood draw as a matter of policy-a policy that was 
outlined by Officer Anjelkovich when she stated that a blood draw must be conducted because 
Mr~ Lutton had admitted to consuming an alcoholic beverage at some earlier time and because 
. there had_been a car accident resulting in bodily injury. Because there was no probable cause that 
Mr. Lutton had committed any crime requiring a blood draw, the search in this matter was. 
unreasonable and thus unlawful. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Tlie state conducted a warrantless search of Mr. Lutton. The state did not secure a 
warrant-and the search was not conducted pursuant to any well-established exception to the 
warrant requirement and was thus unlawful. Additionally, the search itself was unreasonable and 
thus unlawful. The Court should therefore grant Mr. Lutton's Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
order that any results from the search, and any fruits thereof, cannot be used against him in any 
criminal proceedings. 
.yl. 
DATEDthis 'SD dayofJanuary,2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30'day of January. 2015, I caused a true and correct 




to: Boise County Prosecutor, P.O. Box 186, Idaho City, ID 8363l-018(i, 
. . 
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. IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATEOFfDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 















CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Defendant Lawrence Lutton, through his attorneys, moves the Court for its Order 
suppressing as evidence against him in all criminal _proceedings the fruits of the search and 
seizure of his person on May 23, 2014 and May 24, 2014. This Motion is brought pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and is supported by the 
contemporaneously filed memorandum of counsel. 
Mr. Lutton requests an evidentiary hearing be set on or before February 12,2015, and the 
opportunity to present a post-hearing supporting memorandum oflaw. 








. -_:: . , . · .. _ 
\_ 
. ¥L 
DATED this _3ti day of January, 2015. 
. ., . . 
... :: f, ·: .ifr/< _ ·. '; ·>··u ?~~TIFICA; OF SERVICE _ 
fHEREB'V CERTIFY that on this _.2L day of January, 2015, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the fore'going document to be: 




to: Boise County Prosecutor, P.O. Box 186, Idaho City, ID 83631-0186 
~Li ;1~ Miael Bartlett 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR 'rHE COUNTY OFBOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 









Case No. CR' 2014-01131 
STIPULATION TO RESET 
MOTION HEARING 
_____________ ) 
IAN W. GEE/ JAY F. :rtOSENTHAL / JOLENE C. MALONEY. Prosecuting 
Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, State of Idaho and Michael J. Bat1lett, Attorney for 
the above named Defendant; do hereby stipulate and agree to reset the Motion Heating to 
Suppress scheduled for'February 12'". 2015, at 10:00 a.m. o'clock at the Boise County 
Courthouse, to Febmary 24th, 2D1S. at 1:00 p.m. o'clock at the Ada County Courthouse as 
the State anticipates at least six witnesses and there is insufficient time on the District Court 
schedule in Boise County and further for the convenience of witnesses in as much as all 
reside in Ad:a County. 
DATED this /g~y ofFebroary,201S. , .. :;:<. 
Ian W. , e · b Jay R Rosentha I/Jolene C. Maloney 
Boise .· · nty Prosecuting Attorney/Deputies 
..f't . 
DATED this ft.. day ofFebruaty, 2015. {J 
. ~JJ;il .~ 
. ~]J.8~tt 
Attorney fo1· Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 










) ______________ ) 
Case No. CR 2014-01131 
ORDERFOR 
CONTINUANCE 
UPON STIPULATION of the State and Counsel for the Defendant and good 
cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Motion Hearing to Suppress currently 
scheduled for February Ii\ 2015 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. at the Boise County Courthouse 
in the above-entitled matter will be reset to February 241\ 2015 at 1 :00 o'clock p.m. at the 
Ada County Courthouse for the reasons stated in the Stipulation and agreed upon by the 
parties. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this !i_ day of ~'8' , 2015. 
PAT CKOWEN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
STIPULATION/ORDER TO RESET (LA WREN CE R. LUTTON), Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / day of fe0 , 2015, I 
caused to be served a tme copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
U.S.MAIL 
POSTAGE PREPAID 
Michael J. Bartlett 
Attorney At Law 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 ,t f /t-'(, ... Y1S-- 8 2, 1-, 
Boise County Prosecutor's Office 
406 Montgomery Street 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
€· M.J1Jl 
HAND DELIVERED TELECOPY 
pv:, St" 
___1111~:-JCTHNI~ 
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6B-COURTROOM 
Time Speaker Note 
2:06:08 PM /Motion Hearing :call of case; Def pres w/DA 
!CR-2014-1131 l 
!state v Lawrence I 
IR Lutton - Judge I 
! Patrick H Owen - ! 
: Dpty Prosecutor : 
: Rosenthal/Malan ! 
!ey - Defense Atty ! 
!Michael Bartlett - i 
!coURT ! 
/REPORTER [ 
lKasey Redlich - l 
!Clerk Brenda I 
/Wood l 
I I 
2:07:21 PM IPA itactually based and w/file motion after evidentiary 
2:07:50 PM JJ !suppression to proceed 
2:08:03 PM }DA !exclude witnesses 
2:08:11 PM JJ jgranted 
2:08:54 PM Joa Ito explain to witnesses 
2:09:08 PM Jc!erk lswears in states first witness 
2:09:36 PM JPA-rosenthal !Jonathan Vance ISP-Direct examination 
2:18:04 PM }DA jTrpr Vance -Cross examination 
2:32:38 PM JPA jobjection-repetious 
2:32:41 PM f J !overruled 
2:32:47 PM }DA !continues 
2:35:04 PM }PA jTrpr Vance -Re-direct examination 
···~'.~::!~··=~··l~A ......................................... ....... ,.~~j~:~~nish··ouestion······································································································· .. ··································· 
2:36:49 PM }PA !finishes question-continues 
2:37:45 PM }DA jobj -not expert of law 
2:37:54 PM [J !overruled 
2:37:58 PM f PA -I continues 
2:39:17 PM JJ jhas question for witness 
2:40:57 PM }DA jTrpr Vance -Re-cross examination 
2:41 :39 PM JJ ! Nothing further and the witness steps down 
2:42:12 PM f PA !calls next witness 
2:42:34 PM fclerk !swears in witness 
···2:42:38 .. PM··t PA-Maloney°"················lchris .. Anjelvich··-Direct""examination······· .. ······7y···-- . r ········· .. • f .................... . 
···2:53:58 .. PM··toA·············································"·!Anjelvich··-cross··examination·····································t:::l()_~aJ!o\J.lct:) .................. .. 
3:01:23 PM f DA jplay audio w/o obj from state/ Stip to forwarding audio 18 
l lminutes in at hospital 
3:03:36 PM jPA jqualified obj to audio w/o obj 
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Time Speaker Note 
3:03:52 PM /DA /plays audio 
t~~ ~!::~:/~~ :::::=:::::=::~:r::~~~~:E~;~::::;:~:::~~::=:=:tlOiIG~7rr::=: =: 
{ ~.~:;: . :~-i~A- __ ___ -!~;::"~x~~:i~~/;:
5
the .woness . steps. down _ _ _ -_·_ ----· ...  ·. _- __ 
·3:·1:f18 PM lPA jcalls next witness 
· 3:.1°:3:37 PM 1c1erk :swears in witness 
3:.14.:01 PM 1PA-Rosenthal !Debra Chapman -Direct examination 
3:16:56 PM fDa lno questions 
3: 17:02 PM lJ jNothing further and the witness steps down 
3:17:08 PM 1PA lstate rests 
··3:.17:22 PM 1DA !calls witness 
3: 17:52 PM f c1erlk I swears in witness 
3:18:15 PM 1DA lchris Zimmer -Direct examination 
3:25:21 PM f PA-Maloney !Zimmer-Cross examination 
3:28:01 PM fJ lNothing further and the witness steps down 
3:28:17 PM f oa lreq recess · 
3:30:43 PM 1oA lcalls next witness 
-;:;;:~!··:~ -l~~loney·--- -~;~;~:::n~io:~~~~~~~ a:~·~;:::ion ----- - - · ------
... ~; ~~;1: .. :~.'t~A ................................................ ,.::n;no~: .. foundation . -proceeds .. with .. witness ..................................................................... .. 
:~:~::~~ .. :~-l~~loney__ ---- l~!~E~~-;:~~~~~:• .. direct -- ----------- ------~: 
-!:!;:~~··:~ ,~~loney____ -t::::~~~~:~:::::~::tion ------ ---- ---------- -----
3:43:45 PM loA jchapman.-Re-direct examination 
... ~;:;~~··=~··f ~A················································l·~:i:;i~~;urther _  and._the._witness .. steps .. down ...................................................................... . 
3:44:19 PM f clerk !swears in Def 
... 3 :44: 38 .. PM..J DA .............................................. ..1 Lawrence .. Lutton .. -Direct .. examination ......................................................................................... .. 
3:53:10 PM I PA -Rosenthal :Lutton -Cross examination 
-~:E:: .. :~ lr:_R --- -- --1~!'.:~::;~::~~~stion ----- ------ -- ---------
. ~; ~:; ~~··:~-·i ~;-R ......................................... 1 ~~~~~:~o:;speculation .............................................................................................................................................. . 
3:55:06 PM f PA-R !continues cross 
... ~; ~:; ~!··:~··t ~A ............. ................................... /.~~~~:U~ec~lation ..................................................................... ............................................................................................ . 
3:56:20 PM f PA-R !continues cross 
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Time Speaker Note 
3:57:48 PM )DA /obj 
... 3:57:50 PM u· ..  ... .. . ..  . .. l over .... . 
3:57:52 PM 1PA !continues 
3:57:55 PM JOA !Lutton -Re-direct examination 
3:58:16 PM JJ !Nothing further and the witness steps down 
3:58:33 PM Jcounsel !nothing further 
3:58:42 PM JJ !would like to have closing in writing (w/obj) by 19th & 27th from 
j 
1
aartlett / Have 2 trials on the 2nd if needed we have plan B 
4:00:39 PM 1PA !we are trying to settle other trial 
4:00:51 PM jJ jw/get decision in as soon as we can .. ... 
4:01 :58 PM iJtCounsel !would like to have some time between trial and decision -we do 
l !have time in speedy 4:02:38 PM lend ···· ························· ···· ( ................................................................................. .............................................................................................................................. . 
: : 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 









Case No. CR 2014-01131 
STATE'S POST HEARING 
BRIEFING AND OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through Jolene C. Maloney and Jay F. 
Rosenthal and hereby submits the following supplemental post-hearing statement upon the 
conclusion of Defendant's Motion to Suppress heard on March 12, 2015. 
FACTS 
On May 23, 2015, the Defendant was operating his motor vehicle on Arrowrock 
Road in the County of Boise, State of Idaho with his two minor children in the vehicle. The 
Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol prior to driving his vehicle off of Arrowrock Road 
and into the reservoir. The Defendant's vehicle quickly submerged. He was able to get one 
child (herein after referred to as L.L.) out of the submerged vehicle and had to cease 
recovery efforts for the second child (herein after referred to as R.L.) due to hypothermia 
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that both he and L.L. were experiencing. The Defendant left the scene of the crash with Mr. 
Mikitish, (who was present that day with the Defendant and in a separate vehicle), to seek 
medical attention. 
Mr. Mikitish drove the Defendant and L.L. into Boise in an effort to reach medical 
care at St. Luke's Hospital in downtown Boise. Boise Police Officers Anjelkovich and 
Zimmer were travelling together in a marked patrol vehicle on Warm Springs Avenue in 
Boise where they observed Mr. Mikitish's vehicle travelling in excess of twenty miles over 
the speed limit with the hazard lights flashing. Officers Anjelkovich and Zimmer initiated a 
traffic stop of Mr. Mikitish's vehicle. Officer Ziimner approached the driver, Mr. Mikitish, 
and Officer Anjelkovich approached the passenger's side of the vehicle where she came 
into contact with the Defendant. On that side of the vehicle she detected an odor of 
alcoholic beverage. 
The Defendant admitted to Officer Anjelkovich that he had consumed alcohol earlier 
in the day and had driven his vehicle off Arrowrock Road leaving R.L. in the partially 
submerged vehicle. Officer Anjelkovich was able to confirm the crash with Boise County 
dispatch and testified that by the time she had made contact with the Defendant, R.L. had 
not been recovered from the partially submerged vehicle by Boise County Sherriff 
personnel. Officer Anjelkovich testified that approximately forty five minutes had passed 
and that R.L. had yet to be recovered. Officer Anjelkovich contacted Boise County 
Dispatch to advise regarding the Defendant's transport to St. Luke's and she was advised 
that Idaho State Police would be dispatched to St. Luke's for follow up investigation. The 
STATE'S POST HEARING BRIEFING AND OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
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Defendant and L.L. were transported via ambulance to St. Luke's hospital for medical 
attention. 
Both Officers Anjelkovich and Zimmer testified they waited approximately thirty 
minutes with Mr. Mikitish before going to St. Luke's hospital to follow up with the 
Defendant. Trooper Vance arrived at St. Luke's shortly thereafter. Officer Anjelkovich 
testified she briefed Trooper Vance regarding the following: the defendant admitted to 
consuming alcohol prior to driving his vehicle off of Arrowrock Road with his two minor 
children in the car, the Defendant was able to recover L.L., R.L. was still in the vehicle and 
this crash was likely an aggravated DUI or vehicular fatality. 
During the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Trooper Vance testified that 
he made initial contact with the Defendant at St. Luke's Hospital. Prior to arriving Trooper 
Vance had been advised through dispatch of a crash at Arrowrock Road, and a minor child had 
severe injuries or was deceased. Trooper Vance met with the Defendant at the hospital and was 
briefed by him regarding the incident earlier in the day. The Defendant admitted to driving the 
vehicle involved in the crash and drinking earlier that day. Trooper Vance was also briefed at St. 
Luke's by Anjelkovich that she detected an odor of alcoholic beverage while Officer Anjelkovich 
was on scene with the Defendant on Warm Springs Avenue approximately thirty minutes earlier 
although she was not able to detect said odor upon her contact with the Defendant at the hospital. 
Tooper Vance testified that based upon the information relayed through officers and 
dispatch that he was responding to an aggravated DUI or fatality. Accordingly, he was there to 
further the the investigation by obtaining a blood sample from the Defendant. Trooper Vance 
testified that he read the Defendant the DUI Advise of Rights form which included information 
STATE'S POST HEARING BRIEFING AND OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
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on the Defendant's option to refuse a blood test. A sample form read by Trooper Vance is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Trooper Vance requested a blood sample from the Defendant and 
the Defendant's response was "ok". 
On or about this time, R.L. arrived via Life Flight and was placed in a room next door to 
the Defendant. Vance testified a trau..111a team vvas v~1orking on R.L., engaging in life saving 
measures. Trooper Vance testified he never denied the Defendant access to his son and, although 
he could not recall the specific nature of his efforts, did recall making an attempt through Boise 
Police Officers or medical personal to inquire as to whether the Defendant could see R.L. Upon 
repeated direct and cross examination, Trooper Vance denied ever stating that the Defendant had 
to provide a blood sample before he could see R.L. Trooper Vance never restrained, handcuffed, 
or threatened the Defendant in any manner to obtain a blood sample. In fact, Trooper Vance 
testified he was seated at the Defendant's level and was attempting to be empathetic as "he is a 
father too." 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons . against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
administration of a blood alcohol test is a seizure of the person and a search for evidence within 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 
368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 680 P.2d 1383 
(Ct.App.1984). Warrantless searches or seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they 
come within one of several judicially recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 
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575-76(1971); Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at 1212. Consent is a well-recognized 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128 Idaho 521, 
523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct.App.1996). 
Based upon the totality of circumstances as outlined above, Trooper Vance had consent to 
take a blood sample during the scope of his investigation. Trooper Vance testified that he had 
advised the Defendant of his rights to refuse a test by reading what is commonly referred to as 
the ALS form to him. Attached for the Court's reference as Exhibit A is a copy of the ALS 
advisory. Trooper Vance testified he told the Defendant, "we need to get a blood sample" and 
that the Defendant's response was, "ok". Trooper Vance observed no indicia of hesitation or 
refusal to participate in the testing. Therefore, Trooper Vance had secured an informed and 
voluntary consent. 
In addition, it is the State's position that Trooper Vance had authority to secure a 
warrantless blood draw absent the Defendant's consent pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8002(6)(b) 
which states: 
A peace officer is empowered to order an individual authorized in 
section 18-8003, Idaho Code, to withdraw a blood sample for evidentiary 
testing when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect has committed any of the following offenses: (i) Aggravated 
driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating 
substance as provided in section 18-8006, Idaho Code;(ii) Vehicular 
manslaughter as provided in subsections (3 )( a), (b) and ( c) of section 18-
4006, Idaho Code. 
Given the report Trooper Vance had from the Defendant, Officer Anjelk:ovich, and 
coupled with information received from Boise County Officers conveyed to him via dispatch, 
Trooper Vance had reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause warranting further 
investigation into the possibility that the Defendant had been under the influence of alcohol at the 
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time he drove his vehicle off Arrowrock Road resulting in the R.L.' s likely great bodily injury 
and/or death. 
The case of State v. Cooper 136 Idaho 697, 39 P3rd 637 (Ct App 2002) is instructional. 
Though Cooper was decided prior to Idaho's recent decisions concerning implied consent the 
decision is relevant to the case before this Court. In Cooper, the Defendant was in the Kootenai 
Medical Center awaiting treatment when the investigating officer asked if Cooper would submit 
to a blood draw. Cooper stated, "don't I have a right to an attorney?" The investigating officer 
then ordered a nurse to draw the blood. In the instant case, Mr. Lutton said "ok" when Trooper 
Vance requested a blood draw- which was after Mr. Lutton had listened to the Trooper reading 
the ALS advisory. As stated in Cooper: 
For the driver who has been involved in an accident which causes 
either serious injury [aggravated DUI] or death [vehicular manslaughter], 
the state must have the usual authority to investigate and collect evidence 
which exists in any other felony investigation. Thus, a driver's refusal to 
peacefully submit to an evidentiary test should not preclude law 
enforcement from making a probable cause seizure of his blood. 
The Court in Cooper further held: 
We hold that the seizure of samples of Cooper's blood obtained 
without the use of force was constitutionally reasonable. Idaho has a 
compelling interest in protecting citizens from the carnage caused by 
drunk drivers and that interest is heightened when a drunk driver causes a 
collision resulting in injury and/or death. See State v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 296, 756 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1988); Ray, 854 P.2d at 750. This 
compelling interest, combined with the exigency created by the 
evanescent nature of blood alcohol, justifies an exception to the warrant 
requirement in this case despite the state's admission that a warrant 
"could" have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence. 
Accordingly, we uphold the drawing of Cooper's blood, without his 
express consent and without a warrant, pursuant to I.C. §18-8002(6)(b), as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
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The State respectfully submits that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress be DENIED. 
~PP.~ 
~LENE C. MALONE 
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of March, 2015, I caused to be served 
a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following. 
~U.S.MAIL HAND DELIVERED -(_TELECOPY --
POSTAGE PREPAID 
Michael J. Barlett 
Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
~(!_~~ OLENE C. MALO¥ 
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DEPUTY 
P.0.1;3ox 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, . 
PJaintiff, 
vs. 










) _____________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
AFFIDAVIT OF lvllCHAEL 
BARTLETT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE JURY TRIAL AND 
ENLARGE TIME TO FILE POST-
HEARING BRIEF 
I, Michael )3artlett, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I am counsel for the Defendant in the above case, Lawrence Lutton .. 
3. That I filed a Request for Discovery on July 25, 2014 in the above-captioned matter 
that requested "permission to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or 
mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this case, or 
copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the prosecuting attorney, the 
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, Mar 20 2015 4:37PM Nevin Benjamin,McKa rt 208 345 8274 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due 
diligence." 
4. That after failing to receive reports of scientific tests made in connection with this 
case, I filed a Specific Request for Discovery on November 20, 2014 requesting "all forensic 
data associated with the testing of defendant's blood." 
5. That after failing to receive all forensic data associated with the testing of defendant's 
blood in this case, attorney Christopher Shennan and I filed an additional Specific Request for 
Discovery on March 4, 2015. This Request agafo requested "all forensic data associated with the 
testing of defendant's blood," including "calibration curves and all chromatagrams generated on 
the batch on the machine on which defendant's blood was tested" and '~records reflecting internal 
testing or quality control testing of all solutions, reagents, or standard mixtures used as, as part 
of, or in relation to internal standards, controls, standard mixtures, or standards in the batch in 
which defendattt's blood was tested." 
6. That on March 9, 2015, I received approximately 58 pages of previously undisclosed 
discovery from the State related to the forensic testing associated with Defendant's blood in the 
above-captioned case. This discovery had previously been requested under my Request for 
Discovery dated July 25, 2014, my Specific Request for Discovery dated November 20, 2014, 
and my Specific Request for Discovery dated March 4, 2015. 
7. That within one week of my initial review of this previously undisclosed discovery, I 
engaged an expert to examine and review the forensic testing associated with Defendant's blood 
in the above-captioned case. 
2 • AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL BARTLETT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL AND ENLARGE TIME TO FILE POST-HEARING 
BRIEF 
Mar '20 2015 4:37PM Nevin Benjamin,M 
i 
\ 
art 208 345 827 4 pagf? 3 
I 
8. That I have delivered the forensic testing discovery to my expert and am currently 
awaiting resuits and analysis from my expert's review. I have reason to believe that the expert's 
opinion could be material in this matter. 
9. That after stipulating to two separate requests for continuances at the State's request 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, I attended a hearing on Defondanfs Motion to 
Suppress Evidence on March 12, 2015. 
10. That on March 13, 2015, my law firm requested an audio recording from the hearing 
on Defendanf s Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
11. That as of March 20, 2015, and although my law finn has contacted the Boise 
County Clerk on at least two occasions since our request, I have not received an audio recording 
from the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
12. That I believe it will be imperative to have an audio recording from the hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in order to appropriately file post-hearing briefing in 
this matter and that I still do not know when I will receive a copy of the audio recording. 
13. That I believe the Defendant will be unduly burdened if required to prepare for trial 
without benefit of the Court's decision relative to his Motion to Suppress Evidence in this case. 
14. That I have attached true and correct copies of my Specific Request for Discovery 
dated November 20, 2014, and my Specific Request for Discovery dated March 4, 2015. 
. . J-L 
DATED This 2V day of March, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~Li? {LJ14!r: 
MiaelBartlett 
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I CERTIFY that on March 20~2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Boise County Prosecuting Attorney, 406 Montgomery St., P.O. Box 186, Idaho City, Idaho 
83631 
~uO~ chae1 Bartlett 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
3 03 West Baruiock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
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CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
lJEFENl)ANT'S POST-HEARING 
BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
l. RE.LEV ANT FACTS 
On May 23, 2014 at approximately 11 :09 p.m., Joe Mikitish was driving his Subaru 
northbound on Parkcenter Boulevard toward St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. In his 
backseat, Mr. Mikitish had two passengers, Lawrence Lutton and Mr. Lutton's four-year-old son 
 Earlier that evening, Mr. Lutton tmd his two sons, Landon and two-year-old  had 
been in an automobile accident when Mr. Lutton's automobile skidded off Arrowrock Dam Road 
landing upside down in the reservoir. 




While waiting for their anival, the officers interrogated Mr. Mikitish and Mr. Lutton 
about the accident. Officer Anjelkovich noted "the slight odor of an intoxicating beverage 
coming from the vehicle" dming the encounter and subsequently Mr. Mikitish was required to 
submit to standard field sobriety tests as well as a breath test (transcript p. 42, ''hereinafter Tr."). 
Mr. Mikitish blew 0.00. When Officer Zimmer questioned Mr. Lutton at the stop, he admitted to 
drinking three beers approximately nine hours earlier. 
After the paramedics arrived, Mr. Lutton and his son  were placed in an 
ambulance and prepared for transport. Officer Zimmer, who had received Officer Anjelkovich's 
report of an intoxicating beverage coming from the vehicle, climbed into the ambulance and 
began a conversation with Mr. Lutton. While in the closed and confined space of the ambulance, 
Officer Zimmer "did not smell any alcohol on Mr. Lutton" (Tr. p. 62). After medics had secured 
Mr. Lutton and his son  they were transported to St Luke's for emergency care. 
According to their testimony, Officers Zimmer and Anjelkovich followed and stationed 
themselves \.Vith Mr. Lutton. When they arrived, Mr. Lutton was in a treatment room along with 
his friends Mr. Mikitish and Rich LNU. Both men were asked to leave the room by the officers. 
(Tr. p. 83). A short time later, Mr. Mikitish attempted to re-enter the treatment room. Mr. Lutton 
heard the officers tell Mr. Mikitish he was not allowed to stay and that ifhe continued to try 
"they could ru-rest him." (Tr. p. 84). 
Once alone, Officer Anjelkovich re-interrogated Mr. Lutton in his hospital room. 
According to Officer Anjelkovich's testimony, Mr. Lutton said he had three beers that day by 
3 :00 p.m. (Tr. p. 46). Officer Anjelkovich testified that, based upon the information provided by 
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the treatment room to speak with him from the officers at the door. (Tr. p. 86). 
When Jdaho State Police Officer Vance anived, Officers Anjelkovich and Zimmer posted 
themselves at the door to Mr. Lutton's emergency room. According to Trooper Vance's 
testimony, he had been sent to St. Luke's by "dispatch" for the "purpose" to "Jetrieve a blood 
draw". (Tr. pp. 4,11). He said he was "going based on what I was told to do." (Tr, p. 11). 
Trooper Vance testified that he had relied on dispatch to determine that a blood draw had to be 
conducted. (Tr. pp. 11-12). However, when asked, Trooper Vance was unable to recall any 
specific information he had received from dispatch about Mr. Lutton. (Tr. pp. 11-12). Trooper 
Vance acknowledged that Officer Anjelkovich had smelled alcohol coming from Mr. Mikitish, 
but had not made notice of any alcoholic odor emanating from Mr. Lutton. (Tr. p. 15). 
At the hearing, Trooper Vance acknowledged that he tried to smell the odor of alcohol on 
Mr. Lutton without success (Tr. p. 15) but that he did not "investigate a DUI". (Tr. p. 16). 
According to his testimony, Trooper Vance made no attempt to discern ifthere was probable 
cause that Mr. Lutton had been driving under the influence of alcohol because he was relying on 
someone else to make that determination. (Tr. p. 17). Neve1theless, Trooper Vance reenforced 
what Mr. Lutton had been told by Officer Anje1kovich stating that because he had admitted to 
drinking nine hours earlier and because there was an accident, he would have to submit to a 
blood test. (Tr. p. 19). 
During Trooper Vance's interrogation, Mr. Lutton's second child,  arrived at St. 
Luke's via Life Flight. Trooper Vance testified Mr. Lutton was distraught and began crying when 
 was wheeled by the room. (Tr. p. 21). Believing his son might die, Mr. Lutton asked 
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someone whether somebody could go in?" Trooper Vance answered in the affirmative. When 
questioned. by the Court, ifhe had "a specific recollection that ... you checked with somebody in 
the room with the medical personnel that was working on  about whether he could go in 
there or not?" Trooper Vance stated that, "I think I stuck my head out the door and was like 
trying to grab somebody or actually maybe I asked one of the officers to find out .... " (Tr. p. 
29). The Court then asked,"[s]o the answer to my question again you don't have a specific 
recollection about how that happened?" To which Trooper Vance answered, "Oh, no, no, no." 
(fr. p. 29). 
St. Luke's Chaplain Karla Sampson had arrived at or around the same time that  was 
being wheeled into the emergency room and noted passing Mr. Lutton's room as she followed 
Riley's gurney. (Tr. p. 71). According to Chaplain Sampson's testimony, Lawrence looked ''very 
very" upset. (Tr. p. 71). She noticed that Lawrence was naked except for a blanket. Chaplain 
Sampson also stated there were two police officers inside the room with Lavvrence, two police 
officers outside the room, and she felt Mr. Lutton was being held in that room. (Tr. pp. 71-72). 
Chaplain Sampson testified she regularly facilitates family visitation and parental contact with 
desperately-ill children at St. Luke's-and she "couldn't understand why [Mr. Lutton] wasn't 
being allowed" to see his sons. (Tr. p. 72). 
Ms. Sampson quickly secured permission from emergency room physicians to allow 
family members to be present at Riley's bedside (Tr. p. 73). She then began serving as a liaison 
between emergency room staff and Lutton family members and friends that had atTived at the 
hospital. Although she was responsible for communications between hospital staff and family 





A. The Search of Mr. Lutton was Unreasonable and Thus Unlawful 
1. A Wammtless Blood Dn1_yy is Presumptively Unreasonable 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articie I, Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches. A warrantless search is pres1.m1ptively 
unreasonable. 1v1.innesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,372 (1993); Stale v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 
288, 290, 900 P .2d 196, 198 (1995). In order to prove that a warrantless search is not 
unreasonable, "[t]he burden ofproofrests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell 
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under 
the circumstances." Weaver at 290, 198, citing State v. Woole1y, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 
1210, 1212 (1989). 
2. The State Has Not Demonstrated That the WaITantless Search Was Consensual. 
In its Post Hearing Briefing and Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State 
concedes that Officer Vance perfo11ned a warrantless search upon Mr. Lutton when he withdrew 
Mr. Lutton's blood. The State also concedes that such a warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable. Thus, in order to demonstrate the warrantless search was reasonable, the State 
must demonstrate a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
directly applies in the present case. In an attempt to overcome this presumptive burden, the State 
claims Mr. Lutton consented to the search. However, the state has failed to meet its burden that 
Mr. Lutton consented to the blood draw. 
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a. The ALS Advismy L~ Not In Evidence; Even{/ It Was, ft In No Way 
Demonstrates Mr. Lutton 's Consent to a Warrantless Search. 
The State attempts to rely upon Trooper Vance's testimony that he read Mr. Lutton an 
administrative license suspension advisory as evidence of Mr. Lutton's consent.3 However, there 
is no credible evidence as to what Trooper Vance actually read to Mr. Lutton. Officer Vance 
testified he was required to fill out the advisory form and submitted it to the Idaho Department of 
Transportation (Tr. p. 24). However, the Idaho Department of Transportation never received a 
copy of any ALS form in this case. Moreover, a copy of advisory fonn purportedly read to Mr. 
Lutton was not provided through discovery. Indeed, the State indicated in its Post Hearing 
Briefing at page 4 that it was attaching a copy of the ALS for as Exhibit A, however that exhibit 
was not provided to Defense Counsel with the State's Brief.4 Accordingly, the record is 
completely devoid of what Trooper Vance claims to have read to Mr. Lutton. 
However, even if Officer Vance had read the ALS form to Mr. Lutton, such a reading· 
would not evidence Mr. Lutton's consent to a blood draw generally, or under the specific 
circumstances of this case. First, as discussed below, an individual is only subject to testing 
under Jdaho Code § 18-8002 when a peace officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation" ofldaho 
3The degree to which Mr. Lutton could have been expected to hear and/or understand the 
reading of any advisory is in question in this case as Trooper Vance acknowledged he gave the 
information to Lutton right after  was wheeled by and after Mr. Lutton's request to see him 
had been re:iected. 
4 It should be noted that an unswom document attached to the post hearing briefis not in 
evidence and should not be considered by the court. 
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In this matter, Mr. Lutton was held against his will by 1miformed, armed police officers. 
In addition to keeping him from his son, Mr. Lutton testified that officers forced his friends to 
leave the treatment room under threat of arrest, that police controlled his movement as well as 
the movement of others into the room and that they required him to urinate in a jar rather than 
letting him use a nearby restroom. Chaplain Sampson testimony corroborates Mr. Lutton's 
observations. She testified she had never seen police officers posted at a door preventing entry 
and exit from a room during her nine years as a chaplain at St. Luke's. The evidence is clear. Mr. 
Lutton was not free to leave the treatment room, even aJler his desperately-injured son was 
rushed to the emergency room. Chaplain Sampson testified that Mr. Lutton was forced to wait 
for approximately twenty minutes while emergency room personnel desperately worked to save 
his son. As Chaplain Sampson testified, no law enforcement officer attempted to determine if 
Mr. Lutton could visit  instead, Officer Vance info1111ed Mr. Lutton that he could visit his 
son only after giving blood. Under such circumstances-and given Mr. Lutton's extreme 
vulnerable subjective state and the coercive nature of Mr. Lutton's confinement and Officer 
Vance's demands-the State cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Lutton's 
alleged acquiescence was the product of a voluntary and unconstrained choice by Mr. Lutton. 
Additionally and alternatively, the State's burden of proving Mr. Lutton's consent 
"calllot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim oflawful authority." 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 534, 548-49 (1968). For instance, in Bumper, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the defendant's consent could not be deemed voluntary when 
premised upon a law e11forcement officer's false statement, but was instead the result of coercion. 
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State caimot prove that the search was reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
First, the search was unreasonable because it caused Mr. Lutton grievous and unneeded 
suffering. On the night in question, Mr. Lutton was in an extremely vulnerable state. Mr. Lutton 
had spent nearly twenty minutes in Arrowrock Reservoir desperately attempting to rescue his two 
sons. Since departing Arrowrock Reservoir for Boise, Mr. Lutton had received no official 
information regarding the status of his son  While in his hospital room being interrogated 
by police, Mr. Lutton learned that  had been removed from the submerged car and that he 
had been transported to St. Luke's Regional Medical Center via air ambulance. 
Mr. Lutton pleaded to be allowed to see  But with law enforcement officers 
platooned inside and outside of his hospital room, Officer Vance demanded that Mr. Lutton 
submit to a blood draw before he would allow Mr. Lutton to tend to his injured son. While 
hospital personnel attended to  and attempted to provide life-saving procedures, Mr. Lutton 
was forced to sit in a hospital room and endure an inte1Togation and search conducted by Officer 
Vance. 
Second, the search was unreasonable because Officer Vance conducted this search and 
investigation of Mr. Lutton even though he had no reasonable suspicion (or grounds) to believe 
that Mr. Lutton had committed any crime. Under Idaho law, an officer must have reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a driver was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of before subjecting an individual to field sobriety tests. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 
474,480,988, P.2d 700, 707 (Ct. App. 1999). An officer may then utilize the results of a field 
sobriety test to confinn or dispel an officer's reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the 
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issue. Because there was no probable cause that Mr. Lutton had committed any crime requiring a 
blood draw, the search in this matter was unreasonable and thus unlawful. 
C. The State's Interpretation ofldaho Code 18 §8002(6)(b) and State v. Cooper Create 
Unconstitutionai Per Se Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement. 
Alternatively, the State relies upon Idaho Code 18 §8002(6)(b) to claim that law 
enforcement officers may execute wanantless searches when an officer has probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed aggravated driving under the influence or vehicular 
manslaughter. In actuality, the statute merely provides law enforcement a mechanism to order 
health care providers to conduct a b1ood draw. But such an order to health care providers must 
comport with enacted state and federal constitutional protections. The statute does not, contrary 
to the State's belief, usurp the U.S. and Idaho Constitution's Fourth Amendment protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The State's strained interpretation ofidaho Code 18 
§8002( 6)(b) would create a per se exception to the warrant requirement-and such an 
interpretation is not valid in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the McNeely 
interpretation of warrant1ess searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
In interpreting Missouri v. AfcNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that ''we read lvfcNeely as prohibiting all per se exceptions to the warrant 
requirement." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 PJd 575, 582 (2014). Thus, underidaho 
law, no per se exception to the warrant requirement is lawful. The State's jnterpretation of the 
statute, which reads a per se exception to the warrant requirement into the statute, would be 
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DATED this 21-,t(.day of March, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,fl 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be: 
. ~1aHed +- t.-Ma, L !Y 
_ faxed (392-3760) 
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to: Boise County Prosecutor, P .0. Box 186, Idaho City, ID 83631-0186 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY F BOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LA WREN CE LUTTON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2014-1131 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
For determination is Defendant Lawrence Lutton's ("Lutton") motion to suppress. As 
explained below, the Court will deny the motion. 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
In an Information filed on October 20, 2014, the State ofldaho charged Lutton with 
Count I, Vehicular Manslaughter, Idaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b), a felony, and Driving While 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, Idaho Code § 18-8004, a misdemeanor. The charges stem from a 
tragic incident in which Lutton's two year old son lost his life in a vehicle accident. Lutton 
pleaded not guilty and the matter has been set for a jury trial. 
On January 30, 2015, Lutton filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood draw 
showing an alcohol concentration of 0.092. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing into this 
motion on March 12, 2015. The State was represented by Deputy Boise County Prosecutors Jay 
F. Rosenthal and Jolene Maloney. Lutton was present and represented by Michael Bartlett and 






















Christopher Sherman, Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP. The parties have filed post 
hearing briefs, and the Court has taken the matter under advisement. 
The Court has received and reviewed a draft transcript of the evidentiary hearing, 
hereinafter Dr. Tr. at_. A copy of the draft is attached as Exhibit 1 to this decision. Any 
references to the draft transcript is consistent with the Court's notes and memory of the 
testimony. 
Discussion 
At about 11 :10 p.m on May 23, 2014, Boise City Police Officers Anjelkovitch and 
Zimmer were working as a two person patrol team. They stopped a vehicle for excessive speed 
on Parkcenter Blvd. The officers learned that the driver, Joseph Mikitish, was transporting 
Lutton and his four year old son,  to St. Luke's hospital for emergency care. The 
officers learned that Lutton had lost control of his vehicle in Boise County on Arrowrock Road 
and his vehicle had wrecked into Arrowrock Reservoir. At the time of the wreck, Lutton's 
vehicle was occupied by Lutton,  and his son,  who was two. With assistance, 
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medical care and were driven to Boise by a neighbor, Joseph Mikitish, who witnessed the crash 
and went into the water to assist.  had not be found when Mikitish left for Boise. 
Officer Anjelkovitch contacted Lutton. There is a recording of this contact, admitted as 
Hearing Exhibit A. At difference points, Lutton is clearly distraught and sobbing, and he appears 
to be shivering. Mr. Mikitish was concerned for Lutton's health and told the officers that Lutton 
had been in the water for 30 minutes and was severely hypothermic. Hypothermia is a condition 
caused by dangerously low body temperature. Mr. Mikitish asked the officers for blankets for 






























Lutton. Mr. Mikitish told the officers that he just learned from Boise County dispatch that  
had been found at the scene by Boise County responders. 
The officers called for an ambulance for Lutton and  The ambulance transported 
Lutton and  to St. Luke's hospital. The Boise officers remained at the scene for about 
one-half hour with Mr. Mikitish, and then the officers drove to the hospital. Officer 
Anjelkovitch questioned Mr. Mikitish about what happened. Mr. Mikitish stated he was able to 
remove  from the car, but  was not breathing. Mr. Mikitish performed c.p.r. and 
 began to breathe. 
Officer Anjelkovitch recontacted Lutton at the hospital, and this contact is also recorded 
on Hearing Exhibit A. Some friends of Lutton were at the hospital and wanted to visit with 
Lutton, but the officers told them they would have to wait. Lutton said he did not feel good. 
Lutton stated he had two to three beers between 1 :00 p.m. and 3 :00 p.m. Lutton was able to 
answer the officer's questions. Lutton could not recall how long he was in the water. Lutton 
estimated that he lost control of his vehicle about an hour before they were stopped by Boise 
police. Lutton was not weeping and did not appear have been as distraught as he did at the time 
of the traffic stop. 
Officer Anjelkovitch explained to Lutton that an ISP officer had been called to assist 
because the wreck was in another jurisdiction, and that because there was a serious accident 
where there was alcohol, the officer would read an advisory form so that the police could obtain 
a blood sample. Just prior to the end of her recording, another officer begins to question Lutton. 
The Court assumes that this officer is ISP Trooper Jonathan Vance. Lutton told this officer he 
had three beers ending by 3 :00 p.m. This officer begins to read a suspension advisory form to 
Lutton. The officer begins by reading these words: "I have reasonable grounds to believe that 





























you were driving or were in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. You are required by law to take .. [ too faint to 
hear clearly]." Exhibit Aat time mark 26:17. While the officer is reading this form, Officer 
Anjelkovitch states on the recording that her contact ended at 1 :33 a.m. and the recording is 
terminated. 
It appears that ISP Trooper Vance arrived at the hospital near the end of Anjelkovitch's 
contact with Lutton. Officers Anjelkovitch and Zimmer positioned themselves outside the door 
of Lutton'streatment room while Vance contacted Lutton. Dr. Tr. at 18. This contact is not 
recorded because Trooper Vance does not have a personal recording device. Vance testified he 
arrived at the hospital just after midnight on May 24, 2014. Dr. Tr. at 3-4. Trooper Vance 
received information from dispatch and he was briefed by the Boise officers. Dr. Tr. at 12. 
Trooper Vance understood his role was to obtain a blood sample. Dr. Tr. at 4. He understood 
there was a crash, with possible severe injury or death., with alcohol involvement. Trooper 
Vance testified he read the entire advisory form to Lutton. Dr. Tr. at 5. He testified that Lutton 
did not refuse or object. Dr. Tr. at 6. He described the scene at the hospital as chaotic, and that 
 arrived at the hospital via Life Flight while Trooper Vance was contacting Lutton.  
was put in an adjacent treatment room. Id Trooper Vance denied that he ever refused to permit 
Lutton to see his son until Lutton provided a blood sample. Dr. Tr. at 7, 21. Trooper Vance 
could not smell alcohol coming from Lutton. Dr. Tr. at 15. Trooper Vance admitted Lutton was 
distraught and crying when his son was taken to a treatment room. Dr. Tr. at 21. Trooper Vance 
denied raising his voice, handcuffing Lutton or using any restraint. Dr. Tr. at 28. Trooper Vance 
testified he was sympathetic with Lutton. Id Trooper Vance testified that Officer Anjelkovitch 
told him that she could detect alcohol on Mr. Mikitish, not Lutton. Dr. Tr, at 28. 
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Officer Anjelkovitch testified she did not get to the hospital until about one half hour 
after Lutton left in the ambulance because they had to stay at the scene of the stop with Mr. 
Mikitish. Dr. Tr. at 37. Officer Anjelkovitch did not smell any alcohol from Lutton at the 
hospitaL Dr. Tr. at 38. Officer Anjelkovitch testified she heard Trooper Vance read the 
suspension advisory to Lutton. Dr. Tr. at 40. She testified that she could smell alcohol coming 
from the vehicle during her contact with Lutton. Dr. Tr. at 42. Officer Anjelkovitch testified 
that, prior to the blood draw, she was told by ·one of the paramedics that  would be 
pronounced dead. Tr. at 52. 
Nurse Deborah Chapman performed the blood draw and testified that Lutton was 
cooperative. Dr. Tr. at 56. 
Officer Zimmer testified he could not detect alcohol from Lutton at the scene of the stop. 
Dr. Tr. at 62 
Staff Chaplain Karla Sampson testified that she responded to the hospital as the on call 
chaplain because the medical situation with Lutton's two year old was so serious. Dr. Tr. at 69-
70. She arrived at about same time as the gurney carrying  Dr. Tr. at 70. She went in to 
see Lutton who she described as very upset. Dr. Tr. art 71. She got the impression that Lutton 
was being held by the police. Dr. Tr. at 73. She requested that the officers permit Lutton to be 
with his child and they agreed. Dr. Tr. at 75. At the time, Lutton only had a blanket for clothing. 
Dr. Tr at 76. 
Lutton testified he and his sons were at Arrowrock until 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. Dr. Tr. at 80. 
Lutton said the paramedics removed his clothing and said his core temperature was between 92 
and 94 degrees. Dr. Tr. at 82. Lutton said he had friends in the room at the hospital, and that the 
police told the friends they had to leave when the police arrived. Dr. at 83. Lutton testified he 
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was devastated because he wanted to be with his friends. Dr. at 84. Lutton said the officers told 
him he had to give a blood san1ple, that it was the law. Dr. Tr. at 85, 87. Lutton testified he told 
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urinate in a bottle. Id. He testified he felt like a prisoner and was embarrassed. Dr. Tr. at,86. 
Lutton testified that once  arrived, he repeatedly asked to go to him and the police said he 
could not see his son until he gave a blood sample. Dr. Tr. at 87. Lutton testified the blood draw 
was mandatory and that he could not see his son unless he gave a sample. Dr. Tr. at 89. Lutton 
agrees he did not refuse or object. Dr. Tr. at 93. 
IdahO's implied consent statute is found at Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1), and provides that: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request 
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1). Moreover, under Idaho Code §18-8002(6)(b)(ii) a police officer is 
empowered to obtain a blood sample if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect 
has committed manslaughter as provided for in Idaho Code 18-4006(3) as follows: 
(3) Vehicular--in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause 
contributing to the death because of: 
(a) The commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, with 
gross negligence; or 
(b) The commission of a violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho 
Code; or 
( c) The commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without 
gross negligence. 





























Idaho Code § 18-4006. 
Any driver who refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing faces a fine of 
$250 and an absolute suspension of his or her driver's license. Idaho Code§ 18-8002(4)(a) & 
(b ). Idaho law requires an officer to inform a driver of the consequences of refusing or failing to 
take an evidentiary test when lawfully requested. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2). 
Trooper Vance testified he read his agency's form of advisory to Lutton. The State did 
not produce .a copy at the hearing. In its brief, the State attached a form of advisory as Exhibit A. 
The Court agrees with Lutton that this form is not properly before the Court as a Hearing 
Exhibit. There,was no testimony about the Exhibit A advisory atthe hearing. However, Trooper 
Vance's testimony that he read an advisory form was corroborated by the testimony of Officer 
Anjelkovitch. Moreover, before Officer Anjelkovitch turned off her recorder, she recorded 
Officer Vance beginning to read an advisory form to Lutton. The recorded language is identical 
to the first paragraph to the advisory marked as Exhibit A to the State's memorandum. The 
Court is satisfied that Officer Vance did in fact read the ISP form of the advisory to Lutton, and 
that this advisory contained the required information from Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-
8002A. 
At the time of the request for an evidentiary test, the officers knew that Lutton lost 
control of his vehicle which crashed into the reservoir, and that there was reason to believe that 
there would be a fatality. Lutton's two year old was in the vehicle when the vehicle crashed into 
the water. Lutton and his four year old son were able to get to shore.  was left in the water 
when Lutton left the scene for the hospital. Lutton admitted he had consumed alcohol prior to 3 
p.m. Lutton did not admit to drinking after 3 p.m. While speaking with Lutton, Officer 
Anjelkovitch could smell alcohol coming from Mikitish's vehicle at about 11:00 p.m. Under 














these circumstances, the Court will find that the officers had "reasonable grounds" to believe that 
Lutton was impaired under Idaho Code § 18-8002. Further, the Court will find that the officers 
had "probable cause" to believe the circumstances constituted vehicular manslaughter under 
Idaho Code§ 18-4006(3). As a result, Trooper Vance was authorized to seek a blood sample for 
analysis. 
· Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 
15 52, 185 UEd.2d 696 (2013 ), an Idaho driver did not have the right to revoke or withdraw the 
implied consent conferred by Idaho Code§ 18-8002. See State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 
160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007), overruled by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014). 
The implied consent established by LC. § 18-8002 was considered a well-recognized exception 
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In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court placed new limits on the ability of law 
enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant. The Court struck down a per se exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. McNeely, 133 
S.Ct. at 1568. This exception had permitted law enforcement to conduct a blood draw in drunk-
driving investigations without obtaining a warrant. Id. Whether the analysis in McNeely applied 
to the application ofldaho's implied consent law was recently addressed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Wulff in which the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the holding in McNeely 
prohibited any categorical exception to the warrant requirement. 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575, 
580 (2014). The Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho's implied consent statute was 
unconstitutional to the extent that it did not recognize a driver's right to revoke his or her implied 
consent. Id., 337 P.3d at 582. The Court affirmed this conclusion in State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 
643,339 P.3d 368 (2014) and State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773,339 P.3d 1177 (2014). InArrotta, 
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the Court held that Wulff and Halseth established that "a suspect can withdraw his or her 
statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of alcohol." 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 
1177, 1178 (2014). Thus, Idaho law enforcement must now obtain a warrant to draw a 
motorist's blood if the motorist affimiatively revokes the statutorily implied consent through 
verbal or physical acts. 
"Idaho's implied consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary: (1) 
drivers give their initial consent voluntarily by driving on a road in Idaho, and (2) drivers must 
continue to give voluntary consent." Wullf, 337 P.3d at 582. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
observed in Halseth, "[i]nherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the 
person to withdraw that consent." 339 P.3d at 371. Thus, Idaho's implied consent statute "does 
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who r~fuses to consent ... or objects to the 
blood draw." Id. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the driver must unequivocally, based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, demonstrate that he or she is withdrawing the implied consent provided by 
statute. Both Wulff and Halseth affirmed the district court's suppression of the results of a 
warrantless blood draw. In Wuljf, the motorist became uncooperative by physically and verbally 
objecting to a blood draw. 337 P.3d at 576. Similarly, in Halseth, the motorist objected 
verbally, stating "You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you just take it without 
permission?" 339 P.3d at 369. In Arrotta, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically considered 
whether statutorily implied consent can be withdrawn. The motorist in Arrotta refused a breath 
test, but acquiesced to a blood draw only after effectively being told that he could not refuse it. 
339 P.3d at 1177. The Idaho Supreme Court characterized the blood draw as nonconsensuaI 










reasoning, under the circumstances, that the driver withdrew his statutory implied consent Id. at 
1178. 
The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances in the particular case in order to 
determine whether consent was voluntai.-y. See Wulff, 337 P.3d at 581 ("Voluntariness has 
always been analyzed under the totality of the circumstances approach: 'whether a consent to a 
search was in fact 'voluntary' ... is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
7 I circumstances."' (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047-















valid as the well-recognized consent exception to the warrant requirement unless consent is 
withdrawn by either the words or actions of the motorist or the motorist acquiesces and 
involuntarily submits to the blood test only upon being told that he or she cannot refuse it. 
The State argues that consent is not required nor revocable pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 18-8002( 6)(b ), a provision which authorizes a police officer to order a nurse to conduct a 
blood draw if there is probable cause to believe that a driver committed vehicular manslaughter.
1 
The Court rejects this argument. These recent cases make it clear that a driver in Idaho can 
revoke the implied consent of Idaho Code § 18-8002. Contrary legislation is unconstitutional. 
The State argues that the motion to suppress should be denied because Lutton did not 
withdraw or revoke implied cons~nt. Lutton asserts that he was placed in a controlled and 
coercive environment in which he was in an extremely vulnerable state. Lutton also argues that 
1 "A peace officer is empowered to order an individual authorized in section 18-8003, Idaho Code, to withdraw a 
23 blood sample for evidentiary testing when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
committed any of the following offenses: ... 
24 
(ii) Vehicular manslaughter as provided in subsection (3)(a), (b) and (c) of section 18-4006, Idaho Code ... " Idaho 
25 Code § 18-8002. 
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the search was unreasonable because it caused him unneeded suffering and Trooper Vance had 
no reasonable suspicion to believe that Lutton had committed any crime. Lutton asserts that the 
implied consent was no longer voluntary he was told that the blood draw was mandatory, he had 
no right to refuse, and that he could not see his son unless he gave a blood sample. 
The evidence is clear that that Lutton did not affirmatively object, refuse or physically 
resist the request for blood draw. To the contrary, he was cooperative. Having observed the 
witnesses and'listened to the testimony, the Court did not find that Lutton was credible when he 
testified that he was told that he could not refuse and that the blood draw was mandatory The 
Court did not find that Lutton was credible when he testified he was told repeatedly that that he 
could not see his son unless he provided a blood sample. The Court found the contrary 
testimony of Trooper Vance credible on these same points. 
It appears that there was a delay of an hour or more between the contact with Lutton at 
the traffic stop and at the hospital. In that time, Lutton had been assessed and treated by 
paramedics and hospital staff. While he was certainly and understandably upset and concerned 
throughout, Lutton was in much better condition at the hospital than he was at the time of the 
traffic stop. Lutton understood and responded to questioning at the hospital. In the Court's 
view, Lutton was advised of the consequences of refusing the blood draw, and Lutton agreed to 
provide a sample. The Court does not find that the police presence was such as to unduly 
interfere with Lutton's decision to provide a blood sample. Under the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court is persuaded that Lutton was the driver, was properly advised, and did 
not revoke or withdraw his implied consent, and he voluntarily consented to the blood draw. 







As explained above, the Court will deny the motion to suppress. 
2 
3 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
4 Dated this day of March, 2015. 
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CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
The Defendant Lawrence Lutton, through his attorneys, moves the Court to reconsider its 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Mr. Lutton's Motion to Suppress entered on March 
30, 2015. This motion is supported by a memorandum of law and affidavit of counsel filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this~ day of March, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
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CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
On January 30,201 S, Defendant Lawrence Lutton, through his attorneys, filed a motion 
to suppress as evidence against him in ·all criminal proceedings the fruits of the search and 
seizure of his person on May 23, 2014 and May 24, 2014. This Motion was brought pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule I2(b), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article l, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and was supported by the 
contemporaneously filed memorandum of counsel. 
On March 12, 2015, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing in this matter. The State 
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filed its Post Hearing Briefing and Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on March 19, 
2015. The Defendant :filed a Post Hearing Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence on 
March 27~ 2015. On March 30, 2015, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order 
denying the motion to suppress. In a motion filed contemporaneously with this memorandum, 
Mr. Lutton has asked this Court to reconsider its previous ruling. As the following will 
.. demonstrate~ the Court 1) improperly considered audio evidence not published during the 
· suppression hearing and not in the record; 2) incorrectly determined that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Lutton was impaired under Idaho Code §18-8002; 3) relied 
on factual findings that, even in a light most favorable to the State, are plainly wrong; and 4) 
misapplied the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Airota, 157 Idaho 773, 339 P.3d 1177 
(2014). 
II. The Co11rt Improperly Considered Audio Evidence Not In the Record. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court relies upon an audio recording from 
the person of Officer Anjelkovich. The Court specifically relies upon a brief portion of Officer 
Anjelkovich' s audio that purportedly captures Officer Vance reading the first paragraph of an 
advisory form to Mr. Lutton. However, this excerpt was never published during the suppression 
hearing and is not in evidence. It is clear from the Draft Transcript that Mr. Lutton:, through his 
counsel, introduced only the portion of the audio that was published at the hearing. Dr. Tr. at 49-
50. On the record, the State stipulated to the partial publication of Officer Anjelkovich •s audio. 
Dr. Tr. at 50. (The State did make a qualified objection, but only for the purpose of ensuring that 
Officer Anjelkovich could authenticate the audio, which she ultimately did). Dr. Tr. at 50. 
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Because no other portion of the audio is in evidence, the Court's reliance upon any 
additional audio in this matter is improper. 
III. Police Officers Had No. Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause to Subject Mr. 
Lutton to a BloodTest. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court found that "the officers had 
'reasonable grounds' to believe that Lutton was impaired under Idaho Code § 18-8002'1 and that 
"officers had 'probable cause' to believe the circumstances constituted vehicular manslaughter . 
under Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)." Court's Memorandum Decision and O~der at 8. 
However, as previo~sly argued, the collective officers did not have probable cause to 
believe that Mr. Lutton was impaired under Idaho Code § 18-8002 and therefore did not possess 
the necessary evidentiary indicia to ask or compel Mr. Lutton to submit to an evidentiary breath 
or blood test. Probable cause for an arrest and evidentiary testing in the context of driving under 
the influence exists "where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of 
which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in 
believing that the suspect bas committed or is committing an offense." Thompson v. State, 138 
Idaho 512,515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding probable cause where defendant had 
sped, officers noted strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant, officers had noted 
bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, and defendant had refused to perform field sobriety tests when 
requested), citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 22& (1991). 
In this instance, no officer at any time noted ~y odor of alcohol emanating from Mr. 
Lutton. In the record, there is no indicia relied upon by any officer at any time that Mr. Lutton 
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appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicant Officer Anjelkovich testified she smelled an 
odor of an alcohol beverage coming from the vehicle; however, after subsequent investigation, it 
was determined that Mr. Mikitish smelled of alcohol~but not Mr; Lutton.· Dr. Tr. at 28. Even 
though Mr. Mi:kitish was similarly situated to Mr. Lutton-cold, exhausted, and distraught-the 
officers on scene developed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Mikitish might be an impaired driver 
and therefore required Mr. Mikitish to perform field sobriety tests. Officers did not require Mr. 
Lutt~n to perfonn any field sobriety tests because no officer possessed any reasonable suspicion 
that Mr .. Lutton was in fact under the influence of an intoxicant. 
It is clear from the record that Officer Vance and Officer Anjelkovich both acknowledged 
they did not even conduct a DUI investigation. In fact, no officer performed a DUI investigation 
of Mr. Lutton at any time. While the Court states Officer Vance had "reasonable gr01mds" to 
require evide:1'.i.tiary testing under I.C. § 18-8002, this finding is difficult to comport with the 
officers' testimony that no investigation was even conducted. An investigation into a crime is a 
prerequisite to an officer finding probable cause that such crime had been committed. 
Even if an officer had performed a DUI investigation of Mr. Lutton and had developed 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lutton had been driving while impaired, under Idaho law, the 
officer would be required to utilize "the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,430, 
925 P .2d 1125, 1129 (Ct App. 1996). In the context of a DUI investigation, the least intrusive 
method for verifying or dispelling an officer's suspicion jg the battery of field sobriety tests. Id 
at 430, 1129. 
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Although Mr. Lutton could have performed the field sobriety tests, Officer Anjelkovich 
testified that she never required Mr. Lutton to petfonn field sobriety tests either at the scene or at 
. . 
the hospital because she was "waiting for the ldahi _St~te Police at that point." Dr. Tr. at 53. 
Officer Vance also did not at any time petform fo~ld sobriety tests as he "didn't investigate a 
DUI." Dr. Tr. at 53: Officer Vance never asked Mr. Lutton if he was physically capable of 
performing the field sobriety tests and he never asked Mr. Lutton if there were injuries that 
would prevent him from performing.the field sobn~ty tests: -Dr. Tr. at 11. Even if the officers 
had developed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lutto11 was under the influence without actually 
investigating that alleged crime, the officers failed to u1:ilize the least intrusive means that were 
reasonably available to them to dispel or verify their suspicions. 
IV. The Court Incorrectly Reads Arrota as Requiring Affirmative Revocation In All 
. . 
Instances. 
The Court finds that, after State v. Arrota, 15 7 Idaho 773, 7i4, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 
(2014), "Idaho law enforcement must now obtain a warrant to draw a motorist's blood if the 
motorist affirmatively revokes the statutorily implied consent through verbal or physical acts." 
Memorandwn Decision at 9. However, Arrota at no point states that a motorist must 
affinnatively_revoke the statutorily implied consent through affinnative revocation. 
In Arrota, the arresting trooper relied upon field sobriety tests to determine he had 
probable cause that the defendant was under the influence. The defendant in Arrota testified that 
he "refused the breath test, but not the blood test. He testified that at the hospital he asked ifhe 
could refuse the blood test, 'but they pretty much said no."' State v. Arrota, 157 Idaho at 774; 
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339 P.3d at 1178. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision suppressing evidence 
in the matter, even though the defendant's own testimony indicated that he had not refused the 
blood test. Thus., the Court's claim that affirmative revocation is required after Arrota is 
incorrect. 
However, even if Arrota required an affirmative revocation, it is clear, based on the 
factual fmdings discussed below, that Mr. Lutton was incapable of voluntarily consenting or 
revoking consent to a blood draw. If affirmative revocation of implied consent was actually . 
required by the idaho Supr~me Court, it would still be necessat)'.' for the State to demonstrate that 
the defendant was capable of affll1llatively revoking the implied consent. After all, if an 
individual was not capable of affirmatively revoking the implied consent, reliance upon implied 
consent would create a per se exception to the warrant requirement in all cases where an 
individual was no longer capable of revoking consent. In this matter, Mr. Lutto~ was not in a 
. position to make any voluntary, informed decisions. 
V. The Court's Factual Findings are Plainly Wrong. 
The Court states that it "did not find that [Mr.] Lutton was credible when he testified that 
he was told that he could not refuse and that the blood draw was mandatory." Memorandum 
Decision and Order at 11. Similarly, the Court concluded that it "did not find [Mr.] Lutton was 
credible when he testified he was told repeatedly that that [sic] he could not see his son unless he 
provided a blood sample.'' Id. Instead, the Court "found the contrary testimony of Trooper 
Vance credible on these same points." Id. The Court also states that Mr. Lutton ''was in much 
better condition at the hospital than he was at the time of the traffic stop" and was therefore not 
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in an emotionally vulnerable condition. However, the Court's factual findings regarding these 
matters are plainly wrong. 
A .. Independent, Uncontested Testimony and Evidence Corroborates that The 
Blood Draw Was Mandatory. 
The Court asserts that Mr. Lutton's claim that the blood draw was mandatory was not 
credible. However, the Court provides no context or rationale for its assertion discrediting the 
·- . testimony of Mr. Lutton.. Additionally, the Court ignores other compelling and uncontested 
evidence that corroborates the claim that the blood draw was mandatory. Initially, when 
questioned by Defense Counsel, Officer Anjelkovich stated that she "[didn't] recall telling [Mr. 
Lutton]" that he would be required to give blood as a matter of policy, but she "[did] recall 
discussing that we were probably going to do a blood draw." Dr. Tr. at 48. However, in a 
published portion of her audio, Officer Anjelkovich testified that she had informed Mr. Lutton' 
that "anytime we have a significant accident" and '"since you've been drinking and we have an 
accident where we have injuries, we're going to read you an Idaho state form to take your blood". 
(Audio, Defense Exhibit l, published at hearing). Additionally, when further examined by 
Defense Counsel at the suppression hearing, Officer Anjelkovich admitted that because there had 
been an accident and Mr. Lutton had admitted to drinking, law enforcement was going to take his 
blood. Dr. Tr. at 50. 
Additionally, in response to questioning from Defense Counsel, Office Vance testified 
that because there had been an accident and Mr. Lutton had admitted to drinking, he would '·have 
to submit to a blood test." Dr. Tr. at 19. In fact, in its argument, the State concedes that Officer 
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Vance stated the blood draw was mandatory, but argues that Officer Vance could demand a 
blood draw under Idaho Code §18-8002(6). In its Post Hearing Brief, the State writes that "it is 
the State's position that Trooper Vance had authority to secure a warrantless blood draw absent 
the Defendant's consent pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8002(6)(b).". State's Post Hearing Briefing at 
5. Given the undisputed audio capturing Officer Anjelkovich stating blood is drawn as a 
procedural requirement in such matters-and given that Officer Vance testified that he informed 
. . 
Mr. Lutton he would "have" to submit to a blood draw...:.the evid~ce is cJear, even in a light most 
favorable to the state, that Mr. Lutton was informed the blood draw was mandatory. 
B. Independent, Uncontested Testimony Corroborates That Mr. Lutton Asked 
To See His Son and Was Refused. 
The Court asserts that :Mr. Lutton's claim that he asked to see his son and was refused 
was not credible. However, the Court provides no context or rationale for its assertion 
discrediting the testimony of Mr. Lutton. The testimony and evidence indicates that Mr. Lutton 
asked to see his son after he arrived at the emergency room, but was unable to see his son for an 
additional twenty minutes. Additionally, the Court ignores independent and uncontested 
testimony that corroborates Mr. Lutton' s testimony. 
Chap]ain Sampson believed Mr. Lutton was not free to leave his room and did not 
attempt to get Mr. Lutton from his room because she had ''noticed that he was being held." Dr. 
Tr. at 73. Chaplain Sampson testified, "it just felt odd to me and I couldn't understand it" 
because even when a parent might be accused of a crime, "[parents are] allowed to be in the 
room with their children." Dr. Tr. at 77. Chaplain Sampson testified that she was uncomfortable 
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and unable to see Mr. Lutton for at least twenty minutes-even though she had been able to 
establish contact with other friends and family. 
Instead, the Court chooses to credit Officer Vance's testimony without any context or 
rationale for this assertion. In fact, the Court's decision to credit Officer Vance's testimony 
ignores Officer Vance.'s inability to recall any other events surrounding Mr. Lutton's apparent 
request As stated in Defendanf s Post Hearing Brief, Officer Vance cited at least four divergent 
and incompatible stories.to relay how he in fact responded to Mr. Lutton's.request. Given the 
unreliability and lack of memory with which Officer Vance testified, it is difficult to justify the 
Court's reliance on Officer Vance's testimony to discredit Mr. Lutton's testimony and the. 
corroborating observations of Chaplain Sampson. 
As soon asNurseChapnum ~ad procured a blood sample, Mr. Lutton was allowed to 
leave his hospital room and visit his sons. Chaplain Sampson testified Mr. Lutton was ''held" by 
/ 
four police o:fficers-an1 remained there until a blood draw was conducted. As noted by all 
officers, there was no DUI investigation of Mr. Lutton at any time. Therefore, if he was being 
held in a room without;being allowed to see  or his other so Mr. Lutton was 
being held for the sole purpose of a blood draw. 
C. Mr. Lutton Was In An Extremely Agitated and Emotionally Vulnerable 
State. 
In detennining that the State secured consent from Mr. Lutton, the Court relies upon its 
assertion that Mr. Lutt~n was not in an emotionally subjective state at the hospital and that he 
"was in much better co.ndition at the hospital than he was at the time of the traffic stop." 
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Memorandum Decision and Order at 11. The Court also states that while Officer Anjelkovich 
interviewed him, "Lutton was not weeping and did not appear have been [ sic 1 as distraught as he 
· did at the time of the traffic stop." Memorandum Decision and Order at 3. However, the Court's 
factual determination regarding Mr. Lutton' s emotional state is clearly erroneous and ignores 
independent and uncontested testimony. Additionally, in reaching its factual determination, the 
Court attempts to again rely on a portion of unpublished audio that is not in the record. 
The Court ignores that, after his interview with Officer Anjelkovich, Mr·. Lutton's son 
was wheeled in on a gurney past Mr. Lutton' s view, with numerous emergency room attendants 
attempting to perform life-saving measures on  1bis all occurred after Mr. Lutton's 
conversation with Ms. Anjelkovich, but prior to the blood test conducted upon lM.r. Lutton. All 
testimony indicates that Mr. Lutton witnessed this scene prior to giving consent. Both Officer 
Vance and Chaplain Sampson, who saw Mr. Lutton after he witnessed Riley's condition but prior 
to Mr. Lutton giving consent, testify to the same thing: Mr. Lutton was sobbing_ and distraught. 
The Court, in its own Memorandum, writes that Ms. Sampson "described" Mr. Lutton 8$ "very 
upset." Memorandum. Decision and Order at 5. Additionally, the Court recounts Officer Vance 
as testifying that "Lutton was distraught and crying when his son was taken to a treatment room." 
Memorandum Decision and Order at 4. The Court's factual assertion that Mr. Lutton consented 
during a period of calm mischaracterizes the clear testimony of Chaplain Sampson and Officer 
Vance and conflates Mr. Lutton's emotional state prior to seeing his son with Mr. Lutton's 
emotional state after seeing his son. 
While it may be true that Mr. Lutton had originally calmed down during his initial 
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discussion with Officer Anjelkovic~ as cited by the Court, the Court is incorrect in assuming 
that Mr. Lutton was not distraught and crying at the time Officer Ward compelled him to submit 
to a blood sample .. 
Conclusion 
For the above reasons, Mr. Lutton, through his attorneys, asks the Court to Reconsider its 
Memorandum Decision and Order in this matter and to issue a Memorandum Decision and Order 
suppressing the blood results in this case. 
DATED this 3 \ day of March, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
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9: 11: 18 AM f Defense Attorney f has prepared the Rule 11 with Mr. Lutton pleading to 
i :count I - Felony - State will rec. 4 year period of 
i iprobation - early termination after 2 years can be 
' i requested - WHJ - 240 hours of public service - no fine 
l-180 day DL suspension with restricted privileges for 
/to and from work, public service, school for son, 
igrocery store and emergencies - def. does have the I right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress 
9: 13: 12 AM !state Attorney f Mr. Rosenthal - fair statement of the resolution 
9: 13: 19 AM !Judge Owen i Motion to reconsider was filed - has not had a chance 
! !to read that - aware that it is in the file but will not be 
I I ruling on that today . 
:: ; ::~~· ~~ i ~~~;~d~:en _ -::es::~ :~: ~=:m~~:dqi;:~~~o~rt Mr9artlett ____ _ 
9:16:49 AM }State Attorney /Mr. Rosenthal - interupts - any answers that the def. 
I jgives today would not be used against the def. if any 
: : rulings would be overturned in the future 
9: 17:48 AM f Judge Owen tcontinues with examination of the defendant 
9:31 :55 AM tstate Attorney )Mr. Rosenthal - satisfied with the factual basis 
· 9:32:08 AM /Judge Owen /there is a factual basis for the gg plea - made freely 
: !and voluntarily - will accept the gg plea - comments to 
i ithe def. - entitled to delay sentencing for Pre-Sentence 
9:33:05 AM f state Attorney f Mr. Rosenthal - there has been no contact with the 
i I mother of the child 
9:33:38 AM JDefense Attorney fthe mother does know about the agreement and the 
: jgg plea and does not object to it 
9:34:11 AM [Defendant !does waive his right to a PSI and would like to go 
i !forward today 
9:34:39 AM f state Attorney f Mr. Rosenthal - argues sentencing 
9:37:11 AM !Defense Attorney jargues sentencing 
......... ......... -............... .. ........... 1 .............................................................. 1 ............. · ..................................................................................................................................................................... . 
9:37:17 AM /Defendant /declines statement 
9:37:31 AM iDefense Attorney /no legal cause 
1 I 
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!finds the def. guilty - will follow the plea agreement and 
lwill enter an order withholding judgment - places the 
ldef. on unsupervised probaiton for 4 years - no new 
!crimes - no alcohol - no frequenting bars or liquor 
!stores - no refusal to law enforcement - 4th waiver -
1 pay Court Costs - no fine - DL suspension of 6 months 
land will grant the privileges laid out in the Rule 11 
(agreement - will seize the DL for 6 months - probation 
lto expire at midnight on 04/1 /19 unless otherwise 
!ordered by the Court - within 10 days submit a DNA 
lsample 
9:44:59 AM f state Attorney rMr. Rosenthal - no questions 
9:45:06 AM !Defense Attorney !no questions 
i ~ 
9:45:09 AM !Judge Hansen lappeal rights 
9:46:28 AM j jEND CASE 
I I 
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ARRAIGNMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO VS. LAWRENCE R. LUTTON 
CR-2014-01131 
BOND AMOUNT: NI A 
lNFORMA TION IN FILE: YES 
COUNT 1: Vehicular Manslaughter (Felony) 
FELONY: Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus, without malice ... 
(3) Vehicular-in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant 
cause contributing to the death because of (b) the commission of a 
violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
IDAHO CODE SECTION(S): §§ 18-4006(3)(b); 18-4007(3); 18-8004 
FINE: $0- $15,000.00 
CUSTODY: 
FIXED MANDATORY MINIMUM: 0 
Zero (0) year - fifteen (15) years in state prison 
FIXED MANDATORY MINIMUM: 0 
OTHER CONSEQUENCES: LC.§§ 19-5506; 19-5304(2); 19-5507; 18-4007(3)(d), (e); 49-325; 19-
5307 
1. Shall make restitution to the victim, unless the court determines that an 
order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable 
2. Shall be required to provide to the Idaho state police, a DNA sample 
and a right thumbprint impression. The court may order such person 
to pay restitution for DNA analysis in an amount not to exceed five 
hundred dollars ($500) per DNA sample analysis, or in the aggregate 
not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), regardless of whether (a) 
The source of the sample is the person, the victim or other persons of 
interest in the case; (b) Results of the analysis are entered· into 
evidence in the person's criminal case; (c) The DNA sample was 
previously analyzed for another criminal case; or ( d) Restitution for 
that DNA sample analysis was ordered in any other criminal case. 
3. If the violation resulted in the death of the parent or parents of minor 
children, the defendant may be ordered by the court to pay support for 
each such minor child until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) 
years. In setting the amount, the court shall consider all relevant 
factors. 
4. The driver's license of any person convicted of a yiolation of section 
18-4006(3), Idaho Code, may be suspended for a time determined by 
the court. 
5. Dot may suspend or revoke the operating privilege of the defendant if 
the court does not 
6. May pay fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for a civil 
judgment on behalf of the victim* 
* Operates as a punitive penalty and should not be used as a 
substitution for an order of restitution under Idaho Code section 
19-5304. 
COUNT 2: Driving Under the Influence (Misdemeanor) 
MISDEMEANOR: Drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating 
substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other 
intoxicating substances, or, in the alternative, with an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more. 
IDAHO CODE SECTION(S): 18-8004(l)(a); 18-8005(1) 
FINE: $0- $1,000.00 
CUSTODY: 
FIXED MANDATORY MINIMUM: 0 
Zero (0)- six (6) months in the county jail, but the Court may authorize 
work detail program within the custody of the county sheriff 
FIXED MANDATORY MINIMUM: 0 
OTHER CONSEQUENCES: LC.§§ 18-8005(1)(d), 8005(11), 8005(14), 32-1410; 18-8010 
1. Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the Court for thirty (30) 
days which shall not be reduced 
2. Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing of 
the penalties that will be imposed for subsequent violations of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, which advice shall be 
signed by the defendant, and a copy retained by the court and another 
copy retained by the prosecuting attorney 
3. Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, 
shall undergo, at his own expense, ( or at county expense through the 
procedures set forth in chapters 34 and 35, title 31, Idaho Code,) and 
prior to the sentencing date, an alcohol evaluation by an alcohol 
evaluation facilit'J approved by the Idai11o depru-tment of health ru.1.d 
welfare; 
provided however, if the defendant has no prior or pending charges 
with respect to the provisions of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-
8006, Idaho Code, and the court has the records and information 
required under subsections (12)(a), (b) and (c) of this section or 
possesses information from other reliable sources relating to the 
defendant's use or nonuse of alcohol or drugs which does not give 
the court any reason to believe that the defendant regularly abuses 
alcohol or drugs and is in need of treatment, the court may, in its 
discretion, waive the evaluation 
4. During the thirty (30) day period, absolutely no driving privileges of 
any kind may be granted. 
5. After the thirty (30) days, the defendant shall have driving privileges 
suspended by the Court for at least sixty (60) days, not to exceed one 
hundred fifty (150) days during which the defendant may request 
restricted driving privileges* 
* The court may allow, if the defendant shows by a preponderance 
of the evidence that driving privileges are necessary for his 
employment or for family health needs. 
6. If the evaluation so recommends, the Court shall order the defendant to 
undergo alcohol treatment (at defendant's expense, to greatest extent 
possible) unless the court finds treatment is not appropriate 
7. Shall pay a thirty dollar ($30.00) fee to be deposited in the statewide 
drug court, mental health court and family court services fund 
8. Shall be required to pay an additional fifteen dollars ($15.00) in 
addition to any other fine, penalty or costs the court may assess to the 
"court interlock device and electronic monitoring device fund" 
/)/ 
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GUil TY PLEA ADVISORY 
Defendant's Name: La W r en. U lvdinC' 
~R1stc No. 
By ___ _,.,..,.~.,,.....::i-~c:;.i:::;R~I ~ ~;'--C~r~k------
Date: i./-2--- 2D l S Case Number: C. R -2D lc/- t 13 I 
Nature of Charge(s): Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: 
· V. mcoslavq,~U!l 
\f)- oooLJ Ct,')(~)k') 
di • ?- - -
1..9, I~ 0(.)v 
I 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY. PLEA OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything 
about the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have 
a trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. 
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in 
court. 
I understand that by pleadin~uilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
before and during trial. Z: . 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty 
to the crime(s) in this case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have 
the right to refuse to answer any question or to provide any information 
that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can also 
refuse to answer or provide any information that might terid to increase the 
punishment for the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with 
respect to answering questions or providing information that may increase 
my sentence. '7--""7,/ 
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an 
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney 
who will be paid by the county. 2 2-
Judge Owen 




4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you 
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed 
innocent. 2-Z---' . 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court 
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) 
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence 
in your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must 
convince each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
I understand that b~ading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and 
public jury trial. 2-;, . 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs 
during a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses 
to testify under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your 
attorney could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could 
also call your own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your 
guilt or innocence. If you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses 
to court, the state will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the 
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense. 
?--&:. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question 
consult your attorney before answering.) 
1. Do you read and write the English language? 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? 
2. What is your age? 3 2-
3. What is your true and legal name? 
L-Ot-Jv'rc11C<.- L ,,,_,-fia'1 




4. What was the highest grade you completed? / L 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
either a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma? 
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health 
professional? 
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health 
disorder? 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? 
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or 
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you 
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and 
informed decision in this case? 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable to 
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case? 
1 O. ls your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? 
(If available, a written plea agreement should be 










11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial 
the one paragraph below which describes the type 
of plea you are entering: 
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding 
plea agreement. This means that if the district 
court does not impose the specific sentence as 
recommended by both parties, I will be allowed 
to withdraw l"!),Y plea of guilty and proceed to a 
jury trial. rv . 
b. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-
binding plea agreement. This means that the 
court is not bound by the agreement or any 
sentencing recommendations, and may impose 
any sentence authorized by law, including the 
maximum sentence stated above. Because the 
court is not bound by the agreement, if the 
district court chooses not to follow the 
agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw 
my guilty plea. ___ _ 
12.As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading 
guilty to more than one crime? 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the same time) or consecutively ( one after the other)? 
13. ls this a conditional guilty plea in which you are 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? 
If so, what issue are you re~e,tVing the right to appeal? 
l"\od.'ul b ~"'-'f(lfe-5J E?VfdlilC'L,- ~ yi,a/-,o1 {k/ 
14.Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment 
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which have 
influenced your decision to plead guilty? 





16.Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney? 
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about 
the crime? 
18. ls there anything you have requested your attorney 
to do that has not been done? 
If yes, please explain. ___________ _ 
19. Your attorney can get various items from the 
prosecutor relating to your case. This may include 
police reports, witness statements, tape recordings, 
photographs, reports of scientific testing, etc. This is 
called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence 
provid~d to yoy_( attorney during discovery? * ~G'J- JO-"\{, \" nJv:5 0-~)6 
20. Have you told your artorney about any witnesses who 
would show your innocence? 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive 
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe 










22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that 
you believe should still be filed in this case? 
If so, what motions or requests? _______ _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge 
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 
1) any searches or seizures that occurred in your case, 
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your 
arrest, and 3) any issues about any statements you may 
have made to law enforcement? 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are 
admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained 
in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? 
25.Are you currently on probation or parole? 




could be the basis of a violation of that probation or parole? YES NO 
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the United 
States, the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions 
could have consequences of deportation or removal, 
inability to obtain legal status in the United States, or ~ 
denial of an application for United States citizenship? o 
27. Do you know whether the crime to which you will plead 
guilty would require you to register as a sex offender? 
(I.C. § 18-8304) 
28.Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case? 
(I.C. §19-5304) 
NO 
29. Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other party as 
a condition of your plea agreement? YES~ 
If so, to whom? _____________ _ 
6 
£ 
30. ls there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a ~ 
result of a guilty plea in this case? NO 
If so, for how long must your license be suspended? ~of'I-JL..t 
31.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory 
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual ~ 
evaluation is required? (I.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317) YES Q 
32.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be 
required to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigation? (1.C. § 37-2732A(K)) 
33.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you will be 
required to submit a DNA sample to the state? 
(I.C. § 19-5506) 
34.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the court could 
impose a fine for a crime of violence of up to $5,000, 
payable to the victim of the crime? (I.C. § 19-5307) 
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your 
right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of,your sentence, you will lose your right 
to hold public office in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right 
to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony 
you will lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry 
firearms? (I. C. § 18-310) 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, 
can force you to plead guilty in this case? 
40.Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily? 
41.Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts 
alleged in the information or indictment? 












42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out JU//:}-
this form, have you had any trouble understanding your 
interpreter? YES NO 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions 
in this form which you could not resolve by discussing the ~ 
issue with your attorney? YES 
I have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form 
truthfully, understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed 
each question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely 
and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do so. 
Dated this 21'.( day of ftipa· [ .~-&.--' 2o /t:;, 
27~ 
DEFENDANT 
I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions 
and answers with my client. 
8 
rUVI \II t V--·-·· 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
COUNTY OF BOISE 
• ··--l., ..• -... ........ j,... 11; 
l 11ereby certify that th1::: iJregoing ,~1~u u1110::11l. "' ."' 
( DlSTRKrr COURT BOISE COUNTY. IDAHO Rec,orded In Book --- Page=~ 
full, true and correct c~py of the onginal on file in 
the cffi~de'1~ ~~'€< filed APR 07 2015 -
Dated MARY .PRIS -0 -
~L':t""''''''' "''"" 
BY ~ DEPUTY CLERK 
~~~ldk 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No. CR-2014-01131 
ORDER WITHHOLDING 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
UNSUPERVISED PROBATION 
On April 2, 2015, Jay F. Rosenthal, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Boise, 
State ofldaho, and the defendant, LA WREN CE R. LUTTON, with his attorney, Michael 
Bartlett, appeared before this Court for sentencing. The defendant was duly informed of the 
Information filed against him for the crimes of COUNT I: VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER, 
LC.§ 18-4006(3)(b), FELONY; and COUNT II: OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, LC.§ 18-8004, 
MISDEMEANOR, conm1itted on or about May 23, 2014, and his plea of guilty to Count I 
____ Jhereto_onApril2,.2015.__ ____________ _ _____________ _ 
The defendant, and defendant's counsel, were then asked if they had any legal cause or 
reason to offer why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant, and if 




the defendant, cir defendant's counsel, wished to offer any evidence or to make-a statement on behalf 
of the defendant, or to present any information to the Court in mitigation of punishment; and the 
Court, having accepted such statements, and having found no legal cause or reason why judgment 
and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant at this time; does render its judgment 
of conviction as follows, to-wit: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime of COUNT I: VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER, I.C. § 18-4006(3)(b), 
FELONY, and that judgment be withheld for a period of four (4) years, and that the defendant be 
placed on unsupervised probation subject to the following conditions, to-wit: 
A. That the probation is granted to and accepted by the probationer, subject to all its tenns 
and conditions and with the understanding that the Court may at any time, in case of the violation of 
the terms of the probation, cause the probationer to be returned to the Couri: for the imposition of 
sentence as prescribed by law or any other punishment as the Court may see fit to hand down. 
B. That the probationer shall be under the legal custody and control of the District Comt 
with unsupervised probation and subject to the rules of probation as prescribed by the District Court. 
C. That during said period of probation the said defendant shall not violate any law or 
ordinance of the United States or any city, state or com1ty therein, wherein a fine or bond forfeiture 
of more than $100.00 or a jail tem1 could have been imposed as a penalty. 
D. Special conditions, to wit: 
·---------------------·---------·-----
1. Defendant shall pay the sums set out in this judgment for fines, fees, restitution, 
costs, etc., to the Boise County Clerk's Office. 
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2. Defendant shall not purchase, possess or consume any alcoholic beverages while 
on probation. 
3. Defendant shall not frequent or work at any establishments where alcohol is the 
main source of income. 
4. Defendant agrees to tests ofbiood, breath, saliva or urine or other chemical tests 
for the detection of alcohol and/or drugs at the request of any law enforcement officer. 
5. Defendant agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment rights applying to search and 
seizure as provided by the United States Constitution, and to submit to a search by any law 
enforcement officer of his person, residence, vehicle or other property upon request. Defendant 
shall not reside with any person who does not consent to such a search. 
6. The defendant shall submit a DNA sample and right thumbprint impression to 
authorities pursuant to LC. § 19-5506. 
7. Defendant shall perfo1m 240 hours of self-administered public service via secular, 
non-profit organization in lieu of thirty (30) days jail. The community service shall be performed 
within 12 months and proof is to be filed with the Court. 
Count II of the Information is hereby dismissed 'pursuant to the plea agreement. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 31-3201A(b) the defendant shall pay comi costs in the 
amount of$17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 
31-4502; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the amount of$10.00 pursuant to LC.§ 31-3201B; ISTARS 
technology fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-3201(5); $75.00 reimbursement, to the 
Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to LC. § 72-1025; and Peace Officer Temporary Disability. 
Fund in the amount of $3.00 pursuant to LC.§ 72-1105. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's driver's license or permit is suspended 
for a period of six (6) months pursuant to LC. § 18-8005, to commence from the date of this 
order, during whkh time defendant shall have restricted driving privileges. 
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This probation shall expire at midnight on April 1, 2019, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
You, LAWRENCE R. LUTTON, are hereby notified that you have the right to appeal this 
order to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two ( 4 2) days 
from the entry of this judgment. 
You are further notified that you have· the right to be represented by an attorney in any 
appeal, that if you cannot afford to retain an attorney, one may be appointed at public expense. 
Further, if you are a needy person, the costs of the appeal may be paid for by the State ofidaho. 
If you have questions about your appeal rights, you should consult your present lawyer. 
IT rs so ORDERED. 
Dated this zn<l day of April, 2015. 
-------------------------
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This is to certify that I have read or had read to me and fully understand and accept all the 
conditions, regulations and restrictions under which I an1 being granted probation. I will abide by 
and conform to them strictly and fully understand that my failure to do so may result in the 
revocation of my probation. 
Probationer Date of Acceptance 
Witness 
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I hereby certify that on the l day of April, 2015, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the wi.thin instrument to: 
BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
406 MONTGOMERY STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 186 
IDAHO CITY, IDAHO 83'631 
MICHAEL J. BARTLETT 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
PO BOX2772. 
BOISE, ID 83701 
ADA ~OUNTY JAIL 
VIA: EMAIL 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT 
VIA: EMAIL 
DRIVER SERVICES 
IDAHO DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION 
PO BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707 
MARY T. PRISCO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bois~ County, Idaho 
ORDER WITHHOLDING JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF UNSUPERVISED PROBATION - Page 6 
Jo~ . 
DISTRICT COURi BOl~E COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded in Book __ _.Page_ _ 




NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
By---.,~~~~~0;...:::;C:;_,r_k ~-
DEPU1Y 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
mbartlett@nbmlaw.com 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
AGREEMENT FOR DISPOSITION 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 11 
_________ ) 
1. Pursuant to Rule 1 l(d)(l)(B) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, the parties have 
engaged in discussions and have reached an agreement which contemplates the entry of a 
guilty plea to Vehicular Manslaughter, Idaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b), Felony. 
2. Pursuant to these discussions, the parties have agreed to the following: 
a. The State shall dismiss Count II - Operating A Motor Vehicle While Under 
the Influence of Alcohol, Idaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a), Misdemeanor. 
b. The Defendant enters a guilty plea to Count I -Vehicular Manslaughter, 
Idaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b), Felony. 
c. At sentencing, the State will recommend: 
i. that Mr. Lutton be granted a Withheld Judgment; 
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11. that he be required to serve 240 hours of self administered public 
service with a non-religious, not for profit organization in lieu of 
thirty days jail. 
111. that no fine be imposed; 
1v. that his driver's license be suspended for 180 days with 
privileges to drive: 
1. to, from and during work in Idaho, Oregon, Montana and 
Washington; 
2. to, from and during public service; 
3. to and from his son's school, SDA at Cloverdale; 
4. to and from the grocery store; 
5. to and from medical appoints and counseling for himself 
and his family members. 
v. that he be placed on probation for a period of four years but that 
he may petition the court for early termination after two years. 
3. The parties further agree that this guilty plea is conditional and that Mr. Lutton 
is entitled to appeal the District Court's Order Denying his Motion to Suppress 
as Well as the Motion for Reconsideration. 
4. The parties also agree that the present agreement is entered pursuant to Rule 
ll(d)(l)(B) with the understanding that if the Court elects to impose a 
disposition in excess of the recommendation made by the State, the Defendant 
shall be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 
('-al 
DATED this L day of April, 2015. 






DATED this 2n)day of April, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~ u K1t11t= Mhael Bartlett 
Attorney for Defendant 
~ 
DATED this fl day of April, 2015. 
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TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE ABOVE-
NAMED DEFENDANT: 
On April 2, 2015, this Court suspended Mr. Lutton's driving privileges for a six-month period to 
commence from the date of the Judgment. In its suspension, the Court ordered that Mr. Lutton could have 
restricted privileges for that period of suspension, therefore, a temporary restricted license is appropriate 
and should therefore be issued. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the defendant is hereby granted a 
temporary restricted license to drive a motor vehicle, under the following restrictions and conditions: 
1Z! The defendant may drive to, from and during work in Idaho, Oregon, Montana and 
Washington. 
IZ! To, from and during public service. 
:IZ! To and from his son's school, SDA at Cloverdale. 
1Z! To and from the grocery store. 
cg] To and from medical appointments and counseling for himself and his family members. 
D Other:. ___________________________ _ 
This temporary restricted license may be canceled by order of the court for any violation of the 
above conditions and restrictions or by reason or change of circumstances rendering the temporary license 
unnecessary or inappropriate. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED, this __:i_ day of 
PAfRICKH. OWEN 
District Judge 
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CASE NO. CR-2014-0001131 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, THE BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TI-IAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Lawrence R. Lutton , appeals against the above 
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Withholding Judgment and Order 
of Unsupervised Probation, entered in the above entitled action on the 7th day of April, 2015, 
Honorable Judge Patrick Owen presiding. 
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2. Mr. Lutton has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(c)(2). 
3. Following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which Mr. Lutton 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, this list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
(a) Did the district court err in denying Mr. Lutton's motion to suppress? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) Mr. Lutton requests that a transcript be prepared of the March 12, 2015 
hearing held on his motion to suppress. 
6. Mr. Lutton requests that the following documents be included in the clerkts record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R: 
(a) Mr. Lutton's Memorandum in Support of Motion To Suppress Evidence, 
filed on January 30, 2015; 
(b) State's Post Hearing Briefing and Objection to Defendant's Motion To 
Suppress, filed on March, 19, 2015; 
(c) Defendant's Post Hearing Briefing In Support of Motion To Suppress 
·Evidence, filed March 27, 2015; 
(d) Mr. Lutton's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider, filed on 
March 31, 2015. 
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7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested at the address set out below: 
Kasey Redlich 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83 702 
(b) That the clerk of the district court will be paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript promptly after the amount of that estimate 
is provided. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid · 
promptly after the amount of that estimate is provided. 
(d} That there is no applicable appellate filing fee because this is an appeal in a 
criminal case. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to § 67-1401(1), Idaho Code). 
Respectfully submitted this l,..\~ay of May, 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~T~tt~ 
Attorneys for Lawrence Lutton 
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I CERTIFY that on May ff, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Kasey Redlich 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720"0010 
Boise County Prosecutor 
P.0.Box 186 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 













LAWRENCE R LUTTON, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43257 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Boise do hereby certify: 
The following will be submitted as an exhibit to this Record on Appeal: 
(1) EXHIBIT LIST, which contains the exhibits, which were offered or admitted 
into evidence during the trial: 
Audio of Recording at hospital. 
(2) TRANSCRIPT of: Suppression Hearing, March 12th 2015 
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 5th day of August, 2015. 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kelly White, Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS Dated 08/18/15 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 43257 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct, 
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said court this 5th day of August 2015. 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kelly White, Deputy Clerk 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 43257 
CASE NO. CR-2014-1131 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Rora A. Canody, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL to each of the Attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows: 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
IDAHO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
August 5111, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MICHAEL BARTLETT 
P. 0. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Mary T Prisco 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kelly White, Deputy Clerk 
/:JI] 
